Article II
 
The Community and the Individual

     Section 1.  Except when a tradition protected by statute provides to the contrary:

          (a)  No law may deny or impair freedom of expression, peaceable assembly, association, or petition.

          (b)  A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Case annotations:   Due Process

Written notice in a letter giving a limited-term employee three days notice of the reasons for his two week suspension from work is sufficient compliance with the requirement of 61 TTC 10(15)(a), which provides that a suspended employee must receive notice of the reasons for suspension, and is also sufficient compliance with the notice requirements of due process under the Kosrae Constitution. Taulung v. Kosrae, 3 FSM Intrm. 277, 279 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1988).

To be property protected under the Kosrae State Constitution, the employment right must be supported by more than merely the employee's own personal hope.  There must be a claim of entitlement based upon governmental assurance of continual employment or dismissal for only specified reasons.  Taulung v. Kosrae, 3 FSM Intrm. 277, 280 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1988).

The Kosrae Executive Appeals Board is authorized to subpoena witnesses, and may do so on its own motion, over the protest of a party.  For the Board to question such a witness in absence of a party to the hearing, when the party had notice but elected to walk out of the proceeding to seek a writ of prohibition, is not violative of due process. Palik v. Executive Service Appeals Bd., 4 FSM Intrm. 287, 290 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1990).

To be property protected under the FSM and Kosrae State Constitutions, the employment right must be based on governmental assurance of continual employment or dismissal for only specified reasons as stated in statute, regulation, formal contract or actions of a supervisory person with authority to establish terms of employment.  Edwin v. Kosrae, 4 FSM Intrm. 292, 302 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1990).

Plaintiff's due process rights were not violated where the government did not use condemnation procedures specified in 67 TTC 451, but followed land registration procedures to obtain title and treated the plaintiff fairly and in the same way it treated other landowners. Palik v. Kosrae, 5 FSM Intrm. 147, 152-54 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1991).

When a panel hearing in a summary dismissal was closed to the public and the injured party and counsel were present to attend and participate in the hearing and the panel accepted and considered all testimony and evidence offered by the parties, due process was not violated.  Palsis v. Kosrae State Court, 5 FSM Intrm. 214, 217 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1991).

The wording of the Due Process Clause of the Kosrae State Constitution is identical to the wording of the Due Process Clause of the FSM Constitution.  Therefore the court will treat the clauses as identical in meaning and in scope.  Alik v. Kosrae Hotel Corp., 5 FSM Intrm. 294, 297 (Kos. 1992).

Taking of Property

When a landowner voluntarily enters into a statement of intent to grant the state an easement the state has not violated the landowner's constitutional rights by "taking" his property without just compensation, and is not liable for trespass.  Nena v. Kosrae, 5 FSM Intrm. 417, 425 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1990).

Cross-references:  See Declaration of Rights in the FSM Constitution.

          (c)  Equal protection of the laws may not be denied or impaired on account of sex, race, ancestry, national origin, language, or social status.

          (d)  The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and other possessions against unreasonable search, seizure, or invasion of privacy may not be violated.  A warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Case annotations:  The prohibition in art. II, 1(d) of the Kosrae State Constitution against any unreasonable search and seizure is to assure the individual of his fundamental right to the possession of and control over his own person and property.  Kosrae v. Alanso, 3 FSM Intrm. 39, 42 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1985).

Art. II, 1(d) of the Kosrae State Constitution is similar to art. IV, 5 of the FSM Constitution and to the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and therefore, interpretations of these provisions may be useful for interpreting the provision in the Kosrae State Constitution.Kosrae v. Alanso, 3 FSM Intrm. 39, 42 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1985).

Because the Kosrae State Constitution does not provide an exact standard for determining whether a search is "reasonable," this Court will first turn to the framers' intent.  In the absence of an official journal of the First Constitutional Convention, this Court will then look to FSM and U.S. judicial decisions interpreting the search and seizure provision in their respective constitutions.  Kosrae v. Alanso, 3 FSM Intrm. 39, 42 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1985).

To determine whether a search is reasonable, the Kosrae State Court will be guided by the principle that, with the exception of a few carefully defined types of cases, any search of private property without proper consent is unreasonable, unless previously authorized by a valid search warrant.  Kosrae v. Alanso, 3 FSM Intrm. 39, 43 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1985).

The Kosrae State Court, consistent with U.S. and FSM precedent, recognizes consent as a valid exception to the need for a search warrant.  However, consent is understood to be an informed and voluntary relinquishment of a known right and the burden  will be in the government to show that there was consent.  Kosrae v. Alanso, 3 FSM Intrm. 39, 43 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1985).

To protect the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, this Court requires clear proof, not merely that consent was given, but also that a right was knowingly and voluntarily waived.  It is fundamental that a citizen be aware of the right he is giving up in order for consent to be found.  Kosrae v. Alanso, 3 FSM Intrm. 39, 44 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1985).

Consent, given in the face of a police request to search without the consenting person having been informed of his right to refuse consent, and without any written evidence that consent was voluntarily and knowingly given, renders such consent inadequate to permit a warrantless search absent probable cause.  Kosrae v. Alanso, 3 FSM Intrm. 39, 44 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1985).

          (e)  The defendant in a criminal case has a right to a speedy public trial, to be informed of the nature of the accusation, to have counsel for his defense, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, and to compel attendance of witnesses in his behalf.

          (f)  A person may not be compelled to give evidence that may be used against him in a criminal case, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Cross-references:  See Declaration of Rights in the FSM Constitution.

          (g)  Excessive bail may not be required, excessive fines imposed, or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. The writ of habeas corpus may not be suspended unless required for public safety in cases of rebellion or invasion.

          (h)  Capital punishment is prohibited.

          (i)  Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited except to punish crime.

          (j)  A bill of attainder or ex post facto law may not be passed.

          (k)  A citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia may travel and migrate within the State.

          (1)  Imprisonment for debt is prohibited.

Cross-references:  See Declaration of Rights in the FSM Constitution.

     Section 2.  The State Government shall protect the State's traditions as may be required by the public interest.

     Section 3.  Any conveyance of land from a parent or parents to a child or children, may be subject to such conditions as the parent or parents deem appropriate, provided, that such conditions are in writing at the time of conveyance and duly reflected in the certificate of title.
(Section 3 added by 1995 Con. Con.)

     Section 4.  The lawful authority to perform marriage ceremonies shall not be vested in those individuals who hold public office, including the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker, Vice Speaker, or any State Court justices.
(Section 4 added by 1995 Con. Con.)