FSM SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION
Cite as FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652 (Kos. 2024)
GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF
MICRONESIA, by and through the FSM Department
of Justice,
Plaintiff,
vs.
URSULA ALIK d/b/a ASCO Hotel,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2024-2000
ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Chang B. William
Associate Justice
Hearing: December 12, 2024
Decided: December 16, 2024
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:
Jesse S. Mihkel, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
FSM Department of Justice
P.O. Box PS-105
Palikir, Pohnpei FM 96941
For the Defendant:
Ursula Alik, pro se
P.O. Box 213
Tofol, Kosrae FM 96944
For the Defendant in Interpleader:
Nora E, Sigrah, Esq.
(FSM Development Bank)
P.O. Box M
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941
* * * *
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order must set forth the reasons for its issuance; must be specific in terms; must describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained, and every order granting an injunction and every restraining order is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 656 (Kos. 2024).
A restraining order or preliminary injunction will not issue except upon the giving of security by the
applicant, in such sum, if any, as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained, except that no such security shall be required of the FSM or of any officer or agency thereof. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 656 n.5 (Kos. 2024).
FSM Civil Rule 65 provides for issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions pending the court's final decisions, but does not itself set forth standards for injunctive relief. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 656 (Kos. 2024).
In exercising its broad discretion in deciding on the motion for injunctive relief, a court applies the long established standard, where it considers four factors, which are: 1) the likelihood of success on the merits of the party seeking injunctive relief, 2) the possibility of irreparable injury to the moving party, 3) the balance of possible injuries or inconveniences to the parties which would result from granting or denying relief, and 4) any impact on the public interest. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 656 (Kos. 2024).
Injunctive relief can be granted when only three of the four factors favor the granting of the preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction's issuance is largely a matter of the facts of each situation and thus a matter for the trial judge's discretion since the court's consideration of the four factors is flexible – no single factor is determinative, and the court need not give each factor equal weight. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 657 & n.7 (Kos. 2024).
A preliminary injunction's object is to preserve the status quo pending the litigation on the merits, and the status quo is the last uncontested status between the parties which preceded the controversy. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 657 (Kos. 2024).
The phrase "maintaining the status quo" transforms an injunction essentially prohibitive into an injunction essentially mandatory. The phrase is commonly employed in discussing mandatory injunctions compelling the surrender of possession of realty by the actual peaceable occupant at the time the injunction has been secured, but the phrase has been defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 657 n.8 (Kos. 2024).
One who seeks an injunction pending appeal must show irreparable injury. When irreparable harm does not exist, a preliminary injunction should be denied. The party seeking a preliminary injunction must be faced with irreparable harm, and there must be no adequate alternative remedy. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 657 (Kos. 2024).
Irreparable injury is an injury that cannot be adequately measured or compensated by money and is therefore often considered remediable by injunction. Repairable injury is an injury that can be adequately compensated by money. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 657 (Kos. 2024).
An irreparable injury is a harm that a court would be unable to remedy even if the movant prevailed in the final adjudication. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 657 (Kos. 2024).
As a general rule, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate' for the injury. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 657 n.12 (Kos. 2024).
Wrongful eviction may give rise to irreparable injury as it is well-established that the loss of an interest in real property constitutes an irreparable injury, and disruption to law enforcement services can result in irreparable harm, as well as the loss of public services. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 657-58 (Kos. 2024).
Irreparable harm was shown because the loss of an interest in real property is irreparable harm, especially when there is a scarcity of alternatives and because the interference with law enforcement activities regarding human trafficking and the loss of public services from the Department of Labor which provides protection from the loss of wages, protection from discrimination, and protection from unsafe working conditions. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 658 (Kos. 2024).
In assessing whether to grant injunctive relief, a court balances the hardship faced by the applicant for injunctive relief against the hardship the defendant would suffer if the relief was granted, and, in assessing this balance of hardships, the court also must consider potential harm to non-parties because equity requires assessment of harm to non-parties. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 658 & n.16 (Kos. 2024).
The balance of injury favors the Government when the Government is suffering significant hardship without the injunction because Government offices are forced to share space with the Immigration division and the dislocated agencies cannot perform their official duties effectively, which causes significant harm to third parties to whom they provide essential services, and when the defendant's personal finances were previously addressed by the parties when the original loan was restructured to allow half of the rental income to go to landlord and the other half to pay off the loan. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 658 (Kos. 2024).
The third factor that enters into the preliminary injunction calculus is the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, but a showing of likelihood of success is not dispositive in determining whether to grant injunctive relief; it is one factor that is considered by the court, and while the movant must set forth evidence to support a likelihood of success, it need not demonstrate an absolute certainty of success. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 659 (Kos. 2024).
"Eviction" is the act or process of legally dispossessing a person of land or rental property. The term is one with peculiar reference to a tenant, being the disturbance of his possession, or his expulsion, depriving him of the enjoyment of the premises demised, or any portion of them by the landlord. A tenant is entitled to the quiet and peaceable possession and enjoyment of the premises during the term of the lease. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 659 n.17 (Kos. 2024).
"Irrevocable" means unalterable; committed beyond recall, while "revocable" is the opposite. It means capable of being canceled or withdrawn. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 659 n.19 (Kos. 2024).
The likelihood of success favors the Government in finding that a wrongful eviction occurred when, while no force was used to seize the keys in this case, it is over the Government's clear objection and no legal process was employed to order the eviction, regardless of whether notice was or was not properly provided. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 659 (Kos. 2024).
Eviction is a legal process and the modern rule is that a landlord entitled to possession must resort to the remedy that the law provides to secure the leased premises when the tenant refuses to surrender them. If the controlling law gives the landlord a speedy judicial remedy for the recovery of possession of the lease, neither the landlord nor the incoming tenant may resort to self-help to recover possession of the leased property from the tenant. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 659 n.20 (Kos. 2024).
In deciding what issues are imbued with "public interest," courts have given considerable weight to the policies of Congress, the Executive branch, and local governments, in particular areas such as national defense, the environment, law enforcement, employment discrimination, and savings and loan institutions. But most commonly, preliminary injunction may be available to redress alleged civil rights violations. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 659-60 (Kos. 2024).
The public interest factor weighs heavily in favor of the Government when there are not one, but two law enforcement agencies whose operations have been significantly disrupted, and the public is denied essential services from both because of the evictions and when those two executive agencies protect civil rights and even basic human rights of third parties, to both citizen and non-citizen alike. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 660 (Kos. 2024).
When irreparable harm was shown, and all four factors weigh in favor of granting the preliminary injunction in favor of the Government, matters will return to the time when the Government had quiet enjoyment of the premises, and the bank was receiving rents under a letter of assignment because the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo, which is the last peaceable uncontested status between the parties pending the litigation on the merits. FSM v. Alik, 24 FSM R. 652, 660 (Kos. 2024).
* * * *
CHANG B. WILLIAM, Associate Justice:
On December 2, 2024, the Federated States of Micronesia (Government) filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On December 12, 2024, this court held an emergency hearing in this matter, Associate Justice William presiding. The Government was represented by Jesse Mihkel (Mihkel). The defendant ASCO, was represented by Ursula Alik (Alik), pro se. The FSM Development Bank (FSMDB), was represented by Nora Sigrah (Sigrah).1 At this hearing all parties had the opportunity to be heard, and five (5) exhibits were entered into the record.2 Noting that in preparation for the hearing Alik filed a Statement with the court on the previous day.3
On October 1, 2021, the Government entered into two leases with ASCO, for the use of office space. One lease was on behalf of for the Department of Justice Anti-Human Trafficking Division, and the other on behalf of the Department of Labor.4 Both leases were renewed for a term of three (3) years, beginning on October 1, 2023, ending on September 30, 2026. On July 25, 2022, Alik signed an irrevocable Assignment of Rental Income to the FSMDB in exchange for restructuring the loan. The Government represents that they have been making payments to the FSMDB pursuant to this agreement since then. On January 20, 2024, however, Alik wrote a Termination of Assignment of Lease Rental Income attempting to unilaterally cancel the Assignment of Rental Income. On May 15, 2024, Alik wrote a Letter of Cancellation and Termination of Assignment notifying the Government of the cancellation and instructing them to pay her directly. On August 15, 2024, Alik wrote a second Letter of Termination of Lease instructing the government that they should vacate the premises or that she will seek an eviction in court. On September 13, 2024, landlord executed a second Termination of Assignment. On November 18, Alik wrote an email to the Government instructing them to pay her before November 20, 2024, or she will have no choice but to change the locks and ask them to move out. On November 29, 2024, Alik wrote a second email this time demanding payment by the end of the day, or she would change the locks. Later that same day, she indeed asked for, and was given, the keys to both Government offices from the employees stationed there. On December 2, 2024, the Government executed two Affidavits indicating that their offices had been shut down and that all necessary services had ceased without access to office equipment, documents, and office space. This request for a temporary restraining order and injunction followed.
Pursuant to FSM Civil Rule 65(d),
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
(emphasis added).5 FSM Civil Rule 65, "provides for issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions pending final decisions by the Court. The rule itself does not set forth standards for injunctive relief." Ponape Transfer v. Pohnpei State Public Lands, 2 FSM R. 272, 275 (Pon. 1986).
In exercising its broad discretion in deciding on the motion for injunctive relief, the Court applies the long established standard, a four-part test where it considers four factors. The four factors include: 1) the likelihood of success on the merits of the party seeking injunctive relief, 2) the possibility of irreparable injury to the moving party, 3) the balance of possible injuries or inconveniences to the parties which would result from granting or denying relief, and 4) any impact on the public interest.
In re Gross Revenue Tax, 22 FSM R. 124, 128 (Pon. 2018) (emphasis added).6 "Injunctive relief can be granted if [only] three of the four factors favor the granting of the preliminary injunction." Id.7 "The issuance of a preliminary injunction is largely a matter of the facts of each situation and thus a matter for the discretion of the trial judge." Id. at 127. "The object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending the litigation on the merits." Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).8 The status quo is "the last uncontested status between the parties which preceded the controversy.'" 13 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.20, at 65-32 (2017) (emphasis added).9
a. Irreparable Harm
"One who seeks an injunction pending appeal must show irreparable injury." In re Decision of Nat'l Election Dir., 22 FSM R. 221, 223 (App. 2019) (emphasis added).10 "When irreparable harm does not exist, a preliminary injunction should be denied." Id. "The party seeking a preliminary injunction must be faced with irreparable harm . . . and there must be no adequate alternative remedy." Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).11 Irreparable injury is "An injury that cannot be adequately measured or compensated by money and is therefore often considered remediable by injunction. Also termed irreparable harm; nonpecuniary injury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). Repairable injury is "An injury that can be adequately compensated by money." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). "An irreparable injury is defined as a harm that a court would be unable to remedy even if the movant would prevail in the final adjudication." 13 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.06[2], at 22 (2017) (emphasis added).12
"Wrongful eviction may give rise to irreparable injury as 'it is well-established that the loss of an interest in real property constitutes an irreparable injury.'" Johnson v. Macy, 145 F. Supp. 3d 907, 919 (C.D.
Cal. 2015) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).13 Further, disruption to law enforcement services can result in irreparable harm,14 as well as the loss of public services.15
The Government represents that the wrongful eviction has resulted in the loss of office space that has completely disrupted the operations for both the Anti-Human Trafficking and the Department of Labor field offices in Kosrae. The loss of an interest in real property is irreparable harm, especially where there is a scarcity of alternatives. Moreover, the interference with law enforcement activities regarding human trafficking, which provides protection from violations of fundamental human rights is incapable of financial measurement. Similarly, the loss of public services from the department of labor which provides protection from the loss of wages, protection from discrimination, and protection from unsafe working conditions is incapable of financial measurement. In short, irreparable harm is shown.
b. Balance of Injuries
"In assessing whether to grant a request for injunctive relief, a court balances the hardship faced by the applicant for injunctive relief against the hardship the defendant would suffer if the relief was granted." 13 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.06[3], at 65-23 (2017). "In assessing the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, the court also must consider potential harm to non-parties." Id. at 24 (emphasis added).16
The Government represented that they are suffering and would continue to suffer significant hardship without the injunction. Both Government offices are now sharing space with the Immigration division. As supported by the affidavits, the dislocated agencies are incapable of performing their official duties effectively. Additionally, the harm to third parties, to whom they provide essential services, is also significant. On the other hand, the defendants represent that they are also suffering significant financial hardship. As supported by the statement of Alik, the family is having difficulty surviving and are contemplating closing the business. In the hearing, the FSMDB represented that the original loan was restructured to allow half of the rental income to go to landlord and the other half to pay off the loan, thereby providing adequate finances to the family. Without ruling on the issue of whether they are adequate at this time, the court finds the issue of personal finances was addressed previously by the parties, and based on the current presentations of the parties at the hearing, the court finds that the balance of injury favors the Government.
c. Likelihood of Success
"The third factor that enters into the preliminary injunction calculus is the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits." 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948.2, at 196 (3d ed. 2013). "A showing of likelihood of success is not dispositive in determining whether to grant injunctive relief; it is one factor that is considered by the court. . . . While the movant must set forth evidence to support a likelihood of success, it need not demonstrate an absolute certainty of success." 13 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.22[2], at 65-56-57 (2017) (emphasis added).
The Government represents that they have a high likelihood of success on the merits because they have acted in good faith and were wrongfully evicted.17 The Government represents that the lease expressly required thirty (30) days' notice prior to an eviction which they did not receive.18 Additionally, the FSMDB represents that the rent is due quarterly and that the rent has in fact been paid for this quarter; thus the rent is not overdue. Alik responds that the rent was not paid to her, and that she Terminated the Assignment of Rental Income to the FSMDB. The FSMDB represents that the Assignment of Rental Income was irrevocable and that it should continue until the debt is paid in full. More importantly, the FSMDB represents that any attempted termination of an irrevocable assignment on the part of Alik is legally ineffective. In her defense, Alik stated that she thought that the word "irrevocable" meant that the assignment could be revoked at any time.19 Alik further represents that she does not have a loan with the FSMDB, there were no court orders requiring the assignment of rental income, and that she did not have the exclusive right to assign the rental income on behalf of other owners. The bank filed several exhibits purporting otherwise. Without determining all these underlying legal issues, the likelihood of success favors the Government in finding that a wrongful eviction occurred.20 While no force was used to seize the keys in this case, it is over the clear objection of the Government, and no legal process was employed to order the eviction, regardless of whether notice was or was not properly provided.
d. Public Interest
"In deciding what issues are imbued with 'public interest,' courts have given considerable weight to the policies of Congress, the Executive branch, and local governments. In particular areas such as national defense, the environment, law enforcement, employment discrimination, [and] savings and loan institutions."
13 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.22[3], at 59 (2017) (emphasis added). But most commonly "preliminary injunction may be available to redress alleged civil rights violations." Id. at § 65.22[4]. at 65-59.
In this case, the public interest factor weighs heavily in favor of the Government. There are not one, but two law enforcement agencies whose operations have been significantly disrupted, the Anti-Human Trafficking Division and the Department of Labor. As supported by the affidavits, the public is denied essential services from both because of the evictions. It need not be belabored that these two executive agencies protect civil rights and even basic human rights of third parties, to both citizen and non-citizen alike.
In this case, irreparable harm is shown, and all four factors weigh in favor of granting the preliminary injunction in favor of the Government. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo, which is the last peaceable uncontested status between the parties, pending the litigation on the merits. In this case, we return to the time when the Government had quiet enjoyment of the premises, and the FSMDB was receiving rents under the Letter of Assignment.
UPON CONSIDERATION the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED in favor of the Government.
IT IS HEREBY ENJOINED that Alik, ASCO, their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, law enforcement officials, and all those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise from disturbing the quiet enjoyment of the Government's tenancy. The injunction shall take effect immediately and shall continue pending the resolution of this matter at a trial;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Alik shall return the keys to both offices on or before Tuesday, December 17, 2024, at 5:00 p.m.;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Government shall make rental payments to the FSMDB when due and pursuant to the Letter of Assignment, until otherwise ordered by the Court;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED a hearing on the motions is hereby set for Thursday, January 16, 2025, at 2:00 p.m., in the FSM Supreme Court, Tofol. Further, either party is permitted to appear virtually from the FSM Supreme Court, Palikir.
_______________________________Footnotes:
1 The FSMDB is a defendant in interpleader in this case. They are not, however, the defendant of the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.
2 The exhibits were: 1) Verified Petition for Appointment of Administratrix; 2) Order Appointing Administratrix; 3) Probate Action No.: 19-21, Claim of FSMDB against the Estate of Alik; 4) Certificate of Title; 5) Notice of a Secured Interest on Collateral.
3 Statement of Ursula Alik filed on December 11, 2024.
4 The commencement date was October 1, 2021, for a term of two (2) years. However, both leases were signed by Alik on October 15, 2021, and then the Government on October 28, 2021.
5 Pursuant to FSM Civil Rule 65(c), Security, "No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum, if any, as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. No such security shall be required of the Federated States of Micronesia or of any officer or agency thereof." (emphasis added).
6 Ruben v. Petewon, 13 FSM R. 383, 386 (Chk. 2005) (citing Ponape Enterprises Co. v. Bergen, 6 FSM R. 286, 288 (Pon. 1993)).
7 See Carlos Etscheit Soap Co. v. Epina, 9 FSM R. 155, 164 (Pon. 1997). See also "[t]he Court's consideration of these four factors is 'flexible' – no single factor is determinative, and the Court need not give each factor equal weight." Lawson Env't Servs., LLC v. United States, 128 Fed. Cl. 14, 17 (2016).
8 "There is no magic in the phrase 'maintaining the status quo' which transforms an injunction essentially prohibitive into an injunction essentially mandatory. The phrase is commonly employed in discussing mandatory injunctions compelling the surrender of possession of realty by the actual peaceable occupant at the time the injunction has been secured. Indeed, the phrase has been defined to mean 'the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.'" United R.R.s of San Francisco v. Superior Ct., 172 Cal. 80, 86, 155 P. 463, 466 (1916) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
9 See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000); Kansas v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1209 (D. Kan. 2016); Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1963); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Free Sewing Mach. Co., 256 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1958).
10 Berman v. Pohnpei, 18 FSM R. 418, 421 (App. 2012).
11 Nena v. Saimon, 19 FSM R. 317, 328 (App. 2014); Berman v. Pohnpei, 18 FSM R. 418, 421 (App. 2012).
12 "As a general rule, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that 'remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate' for the injury." Johnson v. Macy, 145 F. Supp. 3d 907, 919 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
13 Park Vill. Apartment Tenants Ass'n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 636 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011) ("It is well established that the loss of an interest in real property constitutes irreparable injury"). See also Tenants for Justice v. Hills, 413 F. Supp. 389, 393 (E.D. Pa.1975); Owens v. Housing Authority of City of Stamford, 394 F. Supp. 1267, 1271 (D. Conn. 1975); Johnson v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 734 F.2d 774, 788 (11th Cir. 1984) ("It is well recognized that real property is unique and not fungible").
14 See United States v. Texas, 719 F. Supp. 3d 640, 652 (W.D. Tex. 2024) ("Hindrances to the operations of the federal government, especially as to counter-terrorism efforts, constitute irreparable harm").
15 "Numerous federal courts have recognized that the reduction or elimination of public medical benefits irreparably harms the participants in the programs being cut." Brantley v. Maxwell-Jolly, 656 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Woodall v. Bartolino, 700 F. Supp. 210, 220 (D.N.J. 1985) (loss of "social security benefits"); Rural Water Dist. No. 1, Ellsworth Cnty. v. City of Ellsworth, 995 F. Supp. 1164, 1169 (D. Kan. 1997) (loss of "water service"); Taunton Gardens Co. v. Hills, 396 F. Supp. 370, 371 (D. Mass. 1975) ("termination of electrical services); Staffing Servs. Ass'n of Illinois v. Flanagan, 720 F. Supp. 3d 627, 640 (N.D. Ill. 2024) ("[I]t is precisely the difficulty of pinning down what business has been or will be lost that makes an injury 'irreparable'").
16 "Equity requires assessment of harm to non-parties." 13 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.06[3], at n.16 (2017); see Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 1993).
17 Eviction means "The act or process of legally dispossessing a person of land or rental property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 635 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). "The term eviction is one with peculiar reference to a tenant, being the disturbance of his possession, or his expulsion, depriving him of the enjoyment of the premises demised, or any portion of them by the landlord." 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 643, at 528 (1995) (emphasis added). "A tenant . . . is entitled to the quiet and peaceable possession and enjoyment of the premises during the term of the lease." 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 601, at 496 (1995).
18 The Government represents that the notice was given on the same day that the keys were forcibly taken from their employees. Alik represented that she merely asked for, and was given, the keys without the use of any force, supra.
19 See Alik's second Termination of Assignment letter. Irrevocable means "Unalterable; committed beyond recall." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 907 (9th ed. 2009). Revocable is the opposite, it means "Capable of being canceled or withdrawn." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (9th ed. 2009).
20 Eviction is a legal process and the "modern rule [is] that a landlord entitled to possession must resort to the remedy that the law provides to secure the leased premises when the tenant refuses to surrender them." 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 995, at 776 (1995) (emphasis added). "If the controlling law gives the landlord . . . a speedy judicial remedy for the recovery of possession of the lease, neither the landlord nor the incoming tenant may resort to self-help to recover possession of the leased property from the tenant." Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
* * * *