FSM SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION
Cite as Billimon v. National Postal Serv., 24 FSM R. 596 (Chk. 2024)
OSHIRO BILLIMON and MERLY BILLIMON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NATIONAL POSTAL SERVICE, FEDERATED STATES
OF MICRONESIA, OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL
ELECTION DIRECTOR, FEDERATED STATES OF
MICRONESIA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND
ADMINISTRATION, GOVERNMENT OF THE
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA, MIDASY O.
AISEK, MERLYN GRACE AISEK, ROWENA AISEK,
MIDASY JUNIOR AISEK, MAE STEPHANIE AISEK,
and OTIS (SAMI) AISEK,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2023-1008
ORDER GRANTING DISMISSAL
Larry Wentworth
Associate Justice
Hearing: July 19, 2024
Decided: October 30, 2024
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:
Salomon M. Saimon, Esq.
P.O. Box 911
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941
For the Defendant:
Josef Rold, Esq.
(FSM defendants)
Assistant Attorney General
FSM Department of Justice
P.O. Box PS-105
Palikir, Pohnpei FM 96941
For the Defendant:
Daniel J. Berman, Esq.
(Aisek defendants)
111 Chalan Santo Papa, Suite 503
Hagatna, Guam 96910
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When only Section 6(b) was amended by adding language, the wording, and therefore the meaning, of Section 6(a) was left unchanged. Billimon v. National Postal Serv., 24 FSM R. 596, 599 (Chk. 2024).
Dismissals based on a constitutional amendment will be denied in litigation that was pending before the amendment was ratified when the amendment's text does not indicate that it was meant to be retroactive – to apply to already pending litigation and because of the general principle that, if the FSM Supreme Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or dispute when it was first filed, the court retains subject-matter jurisdiction over the case until its final disposition, even if a change in the parties or some other subsequent event results in a case over which the court would not have had jurisdiction if it were newly filed. Billimon v. National Postal Serv., 24 FSM R. 596, 599-600 (Chk. 2024).
In interpreting a constitutional provision, a court must initially analyze the constitution's actual words. If those words are clear and permit only one possible result, then the court should go no further, but if a constitutional provision is not clear and does not permit only one possible result, a court will then next consult the constitutional convention journals to ascertain the framers' intent in drafting the language. Billimon v. National Postal Serv., 24 FSM R. 596, 600 (Chk. 2024).
Words in constitutions are usually given their natural, normal, usual, common, popular, general, and ordinary meaning. Billimon v. National Postal Serv., 24 FSM R. 596, 600 (Chk. 2024).
An "interest" is a legal share in something; all or part of a legal or equitable claim to or right in property, and the word "interest" is the broadest term applicable to claims in or upon real estate. In its ordinary signification among all classes it is broad enough to include any right, title, or estate in, or upon, real estate. That is the common and ordinary meaning of "interest in land." Billimon v. National Postal Serv., 24 FSM R. 596, 600 (Chk. 2024).
The general rule is that the word "interest" is broader and more comprehensive that the word "title." It embraces both legal and equitable rights, and it covers rights in property less than title thereto – rights different from title, rights which may be enforced – legal rights. Interests in land include estates in, powers over, present and future rights to, title to, and interests in real property, including security interests and liens on land, easements, profits, rights under covenants running with the land, powers of termination, and homestead rights. These interests may be surface, subsurface, suprasurface, riparian, or littoral. Billimon v. National Postal Serv., 24 FSM R. 596, 600 n.1 (Chk. 2024).
"Interest," in common speech in connection with land, includes all varieties of titles and rights. When given its plain and natural meaning, it comprehends estates in fee, for life and for years, mortgages, liens, easements, attachments, and every kind of claim to land which can form the basis of a property right. Billimon v. National Postal Serv., 24 FSM R. 596, 600 n.2 (Chk. 2024).
Broadly speaking, all interests in land are rights that may fall into one of four categories: 1) the right to own, or to hold title to, the land; 2) the right to possess or occupy the land without owning it, such as a leasehold; 3) the right to use the land without possessing it or owning it, such as an easement; or 4) the right to restrict the use of land without owning or possessing it, such as a covenant running with the land or a servitude. Thus, an "interest in land" encompasses a wide range of rights and claims related to real property, including ownership rights, usage rights, and various legal and equitable interests. Billimon v. National Postal Serv., 24 FSM R. 596, 600-01 (Chk. 2024).
"At issue," is in legal practice, a point of fact or law disputed between the parties to the litigation, generally an assertion by one side and a denial by the other. A case is at issue whenever the parties come to a point in the pleadings which is affirmed on one side and denied on the other, they are said to be at an issue. Billimon v. National Postal Serv., 24 FSM R. 596, 601 (Chk. 2024).
When an action pled as a civil rights claim that arose under the Constitution and under national law in addition to their state law causes of action, and therefore pled as a case over which the FSM Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Section 6(b), was a case where an interest in land was at issue no later than when defendants pled that they, not the plaintiffs, were entitled to the possession of the land that the plaintiffs claimed they possessed, the FSM Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate it, and it will be dismissed without prejudice to any litigation in a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction within the State. Billimon v. National Postal Serv., 24 FSM R. 596, 601 (Chk. 2024).
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LARRY WENTWORTH, Associate Justice:
This comes before the court on the question of whether the court has jurisdiction over this case in light of the recent amendment to the FSM Constitution article XI, § 6(b) concerning the court's jurisdiction in cases where an interest in land is at issue. The court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction. The matter is therefore dismissed without prejudice.
On November 30, 2023, Oshiro Billimon and Merly Billimon filed their Complaint for Torts and Civil Rights Violations, Injunctive Relief and Damages. The Billimons alleged that had been the fee simple owners of Land Lot No. 011-A-09, which was divided into Land Lot No. 011-A-09A and Land Lot No. 011-A-09B; that they then deeded part of Land Lot No. 011-A-09B to the Aisek defendants; and that the Aisek defendants then leased to the FSM Postal Service and the National Election Office the part of Land Lot No. 011-A-09B that the Billimons had not conveyed to the Aisek defendants. They further allege that FSM Finance has ever since then been making rental payments to the Aisek defendants for those offices. The Billimons pled causes of action for trespass, nuisance, and violation of due process, of equal protection, and of their civil rights. They sought as remedies the fair market rent of the unconveyed part of Land Lot No. 011-A-09B (essentially the post office building) for the last fifteen years or so (their estimate was in excess of $2.88 million), and a permanent injunction barring all defendants from entry onto and using (which the Billimons characterize as the illegal use) the unconveyed part of Land Lot No. 011-A-09B. The Billimons pled that the court had jurisdiction over this case under the Constitution's Article XI, section 6(b) because their claims arose under the FSM Constitution and under national law (11 F.S.M.C. 701(3)).
On December 26, 2023, Midasy O. Aisek, Merlyn Grace Aisek, Rowena Aisek, Midasy Junior Aisek, Mae Stephanie Aisek, and Otis (Sami) Aisek filed their Answer and Counterclaim of Defendants Aisek. The Aiseks asserted that they held certificates of title for both Land Lot No. 011-A-09A and Land Lot No. 011-A-09B, and that therefore they, not the Billimons were entitled to possession of Land Lot No. 011-A-09B because the Billimons had conveyed Land Lot No. 011-A-09B to Andy Jack and Andy Jack had later conveyed Land Lot No. 011-A-09B to the Aiseks. The Aiseks counterclaimed to quiet title, to compel specific performance of the Billimons' deeds of conveyance (and compliance with the certificates of title), and for a permanent injunction barring the Billimons from further interfering with the Aiseks' possession of Land Lot No. 011-A-09B.
After a January 16, 2024 status conference, the Billimons, upon request, were given until January 30, 2024, to file and serve an amended complaint. On February 2, 2024, the Aiseks moved for summary judgment based on the conclusiveness of their certificates of title, standing, statute of limitations, and laches. On April 4, 2024, the Billimons moved to amend their complaint to add Masamina Jack and the Estate of Andy Jack as defendants and to add causes of action for quiet title, intentional misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and negligent hiring and ratification to those they had already pled. By order of April 30, 2024, the Billimons were permitted to file and serve their amended complaint no later than May 15, 2024; and the national government defendants were allowed to file and serve an answer or to otherwise defend against the plaintiffs' amended complaint, or against the original complaint if no amended complaint was filed by June 5, 2024.
The FSM defendants did not answer. Instead, they moved for interpleader. The FSM sought to make its rental payments to the court for the court to hold and to eventually remit to whichever of the purported landowners – the Billimons or the Aiseks – ultimately prevailed, since the FSM asserted no other interest in the case.
On July 19, 2024, the court heard the Aisek defendants' summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint, the Aisek defendants' motion for a protective order, and the national government defendants' interpleader motion. The court granted the protective order and took the other motions under advisement because, if it lacked jurisdiction, any ruling on those motions would be a nullity. And, in light of a recent constitutional amendment, the court ordered briefing on the court's jurisdiction to entertain a quiet title action for real property; on its jurisdiction to vacate or invalidate a certificate of title for real property; and on its jurisdiction to determine who, among the parties before it, has a better claim to possession of real property.
The Constitution was amended in July 2023. As amended, Section 6 reads:
(a) The trial division of the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases affecting officials of foreign governments, disputes between states, admiralty or maritime cases, and in cases in which the national government is a party except where an interest in land is at issue.
(b) The national courts, including the trial division of the Supreme Court, have concurrent original jurisdiction in cases arising under this Constitution; national law or treaties; and in disputes between a state and a citizen of another state, between citizens of different states, and between a state or a citizen thereof, and a foreign state, citizen, or subject; except that the competent state courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction in cases where an interest in land is at issue.
FSM Const. art. XI, § 6. Only Section 6(b) was amended by giving "competent state courts . . . exclusive jurisdiction in cases where an interest in land is at issue." The wording, and therefore the meaning, of Section 6(a) was left unchanged.
Dismissals based on this constitutional amendment have previously been denied in litigation that was pending before the amendment was ratified because the amendment's text does not indicate that it was meant to be retroactive – to apply to already pending litigation, FSM Dev. Bank v. Weilbacher, 24 FSM R. 520, 527-28 (Kos. 2024) (constitutional amendment was prospective only), and because of the general principle that, if the FSM Supreme Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or dispute when it was first filed, the court retains subject-matter jurisdiction over the case until its final disposition, even if a change in the parties or some other subsequent event results in a case over which the court would not have had jurisdiction if it were newly filed. Fabian v. Ruben, 24 FSM R. 337, 339 (Chk. 2023); cf. Heirs of Henry v. Heirs of Akinaga, 19 FSM R. 296, 304 (App. 2014) (constitutional rights are generally prospective, not retroactive).
This case was filed in November, 2023, after the constitutional amendment took effect. The court may thus exercise jurisdiction over this case only if the constitutional amendment does not bar it.
"In interpreting a constitutional provision, a court must initially analyze the constitution's actual words. If those words are clear and permit only one possible result, then the court should go no further," but if a constitutional provision is not clear and does not permit only one possible result, a court will then next consult the constitutional convention journals to ascertain the framers' intent in drafting the language. Rodriguez v. Bank of the FSM, 11 FSM R. 367, 380-81 (App. 2003). Words in constitutions are usually given their natural, normal, usual, common, popular, general, and ordinary meaning. E.g., Panuelo v. Pohnpei, 3 FSM R. 76, 81 (Pon. S. Ct. App. 1987); Jackson v. Kosrae State Election Comm'n, 11 FSM R. 162, 164 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2002) (citing CHESTER ANTIEAU, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION ch. 2, at 11 (1982)). For Section 6(b) cases, the operative language (to be interpreted) is "where an interest in land is at issue. (The term "except that the competent state courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction" is clear and needs no further discussion.)
A. "Interest in Land" Term
An interest is "[a] legal share in something; all or part of a legal or equitable claim to or right in property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 885 (9th ed. 2009). "The word 'interest' is the broadest term applicable to claims in or upon real estate. In its ordinary signification among men of all classes it is broad enough to include any right, title, or estate in, or upon, real estate." Hatelstad v. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co., 268 N.W. 665, 667 (Minn. 1936).1 That is the common and ordinary meaning of "interest in land."2
Broadly speaking, all interests in land are rights that may fall into one of four categories: 1) the right to own, or to hold title to, the land; 2) the right to possess or occupy the land without owning it, such as a leasehold; 3) the right to use the land without possessing it or owning it, such as an easement; or 4) the right to restrict the use of land without owning or possessing it, such as a covenant running with the land or a servitude. The last two are non-possessory interests in land, but are interests in land nonetheless. Thus, an "interest in land" encompasses a wide range of rights and claims related to real property, including ownership rights, usage rights, and various legal and equitable interests.
Thus, the term "interest in land" is clear and permits only one possible result. The court need go no further. There is no need to consult the Constitutional Convention's journals or other secondary sources.
B. "At Issue" Term
This case, when filed, obviously involved an interest in land – the possession and use3 of the allegedly unconveyed part of Land Lot No. 011-A-09B. Thus, the next question is whether that interest in land is "at issue."
"At issue," is "in legal practice, a point of fact or law disputed between the parties to the litigation, generally an assertion by one side and a denial by the other." BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL TERMS 253 (3d ed. 1998). A case is at issue "[w]henever the parties come to a point in the pleadings which is affirmed on one side and denied on the other, they are said to be at an issue." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 125 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "at issue"). The term "at issue" is thus also clear, has a plain and ordinary meaning, and the court should not go further.
C. Application
The national government, and its agencies of the National Postal Service, the Office of the National Election Director, and the Department of Finance and Administration, are, as evidenced by their interpleader motion, nominal parties in this action with no asserted real interest other than who might their landlord be or who to pay rent to.
The Billimons pled this action as a civil rights claim that arose under the Constitution and national law (11 F.S.M.C. 701(3)) in addition to their state law causes of action, and therefore as a case over which the court had jurisdiction under Section 6(b). The Billimons affirmed that they owned the post office land. This became a case where an interest in land was at issue no later than when the Aisek defendants answered and pled that they, not the Billimons, were entitled to the possession of the post office land that the Billimons claimed they possessed. The Aiseks denied that the Billimons owned or possessed this land.
Since, at the moment this became a case at issue, this was a case where an interest in land was at issue (and it was the central issue), the court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate it.
Accordingly, this case is dismissed without prejudice to litigation in a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction within the State of Chuuk.
_______________________________Footnotes:
1 "The general rule is that the word 'interest' is broader and more comprehensive that the word 'title.' It embraces both legal and equitable rights. It covers rights in property less than title thereto–rights different from title, rights which may be enforced–legal rights" Ornatowski v. National Liberty Ins. Co. of Am., 247 N.W. 449, 452 (Mich. 1939). For example, interests in land include "estates in, powers . . . over, present and future rights to, title to, and interests in real property, including . . . security interests and liens on land, easements, profits, . . . rights under covenants running with the land, powers of termination, and homestead rights." Village of Hobart v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis., 736 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). These interests "may be surface, subsurface, suprasurface, riparian, or littoral." Id.
2 "Interest, in common speech in connection with land, includes all varieties of titles and rights. When given its plain and natural meaning, it comprehends estates in fee, for life and for years, mortgages, liens, easements, attachments, and every kind of claim to land which can form the basis of a property right." Union Trust Co. v. Reed, 99 N.E. 1093, 1094 (Mass. 1912), quoted by Lookholder v. Ziegler, 91 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Mich. 1958); Ornatowski v. National Liberty Ins. Co. of Am., 247 N.W. 449, 452 (Mich. 1939).
3 Later, it clearly became a matter of title and ownership.
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