FSM SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION
Cite as DeOrio v. Simina, 24 FSM R. 582 (Pon. 2024)
MARK DEORIO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
H.E. WESLEY SIMINA, as highest management
official, FSM GOVERNMENT, and JEFFREY TILFAS,
in both his official and personal capacities,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2024-007
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
Hearing: September 30, 2024
Decided: October 18, 2024
Beauleen Carl-Worswick
Associate Justice
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:
Marstella E. Jack, Esq.
P.O. Box 2201
Kolonia, Pohnpei 96941
For the Defendants:
Josef Rold, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
FSM Department of Justice
P.O. Box PS 105
Palikir, Pohnpei 96941
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A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that no relief could be granted under any state of facts that can be proved in support of the claim. DeOrio v. Simina, 24 FSM R. 582, 583 (Pon. 2024).
It is well established that the facts alleged by the party asserting the claim sought to be dismissed are to be taken as true and that the court must view these facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion to dismiss. DeOrio v. Simina, 24 FSM R. 582, 583-84 (Pon. 2024).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion's purpose is to test the formal sufficiency of the statement of the claim of relief; the motion is not a procedure for resolving the contest between the parties about the facts or the substantive merits of the plaintiff's case. Thus, whether the plaintiff can ultimately prevail on the merits is a matter properly determined on the basis of proof, which means later on a summary judgment motion or trial. DeOrio v. Simina, 24 FSM R. 582, 584 (Pon. 2024).
For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court must take the plaintiff's well-pled facts as true, rather than the defendant's, and the court must view any inferences drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. DeOrio v. Simina, 24 FSM R. 582, 584 (Pon. 2024).
When the complaint reasonably implies that petty or malicious motives on behalf of government officials constitutes a deprivation of civil rights, and when, accepting this as true for the limited purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, this is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court cannot say with certainty that there are no set of facts on which the plaintiff could prevail. DeOrio v. Simina, 24 FSM R. 582, 584 (Pon. 2024).
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BEAULEEN CARL-WORSWICK, Associate Justice:
On May 13, 2024, defendants, through Assistant Attorney General Josef Rold (Rold) filed a Motion to Dismiss. On May 15, 2024, plaintiff, through, Marstella Jack (Jack) filed an Opposition to Defendant FSM Government's Motion to Dismiss. On September 30, 2024, this court held a hearing on the motion, Associate Justice Carl-Worswick presiding. Plaintiff was represented by Marstella Jack (Jack) appearing virtually. The Government was represented by Assistant Attorney General Josef Rold (Rold). At this hearing, both parties presented arguments on the motion.
Pursuant to FSM Civil Rule 12(b)(6), this court has the authority to dismiss a complaint for failure "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." "A motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that no relief could be granted under any state of facts that can be proved in support of the claim." Nahnken of Nett v. United States, 7 FSM R. 581, 586 (App. 1996) (emphasis added).
[I]t is well established that the facts alleged by the party asserting the claim sought to be
dismissed are to be taken as true and that these facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed by the Court in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion to dismiss.
Mailo v. Twum-Barimah, 2 FSM R. 265, 267 (Pon. 1986) (emphasis added).1 "The purpose of a motion under . . . Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the formal sufficiency of the statement of the claim of relief; the motion is not a procedure for resolving the contest between the parties about the facts or the substantive merits of the plaintiff's case." 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1356, at 354 (3d ed. 2004) (emphasis added). Thus "[w]hether the plaintiff ultimately can prevail on the merits is a matter properly determined on the basis of proof, which means [later] on a summary judgment motion or trial." Id. § 1357, 685-90.2
Defendants' motion to dismiss is based on the position that administrative process was followed, no civil rights were violated, and neither was there any improper interference with a contractual relationship. In support, defendants represent that the question the question of whether DeOrio was convicted of unauthorized removal of property, or theft of property, was effectively adjudicated in the administrative proceedings under the same common nucleus of operative fact. Defendants further represent that the President is the highest management official and entitled to reject any administrative agency decision, highlighting that the administrative agency decision not to terminate DeOrio contained several errors and omissions. Finally, defendants represent that the decision not to hire the plaintiff was made by the FSM Insurance Board, who was simply informed of plaintiff's conviction of a crime, which is proper.
However, for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the court must take the plaintiff's well-pled facts as true, rather than the defendant's. further, the court must view any inferences drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in their favor. Plaintiff represents that the basis of the President's denial of the Ad Hoc Recommendation was his criminal conviction. This conviction was entered after the Ad Hoc Committee recommendation was made and is necessarily based on a reason not brought before the committee. Ultimately, whether the conviction constituted a crime of moral turpitude which rendered him clearly unsuitable for his position was therefore never determined. Additionally, plaintiff represents that he was subsequently hired by the FSM Insurance Board, however, this contract was not approved for legal sufficiency by the defendants. The complaint reasonably infers that petty or malicious motives on behalf of government officials constitutes a deprivation of civil rights. Accepting this as true for the limited purpose of this motion, and when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court cannot say with certainty that there are no set of facts on which the plaintiff could prevail.
ACCORDINGLY, the defendants' motion to dismiss, pursuant to FSM Civil Rule 12(b)(6), is DENIED in full.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that both parties confer and stipulate to a trial schedule, specifically including a date for filing pretrial motions, and file that stipulation with the court no later than Thursday, October 31, 2024.
_______________________________Footnotes:
1 See Mailo v. Twum-Barimah, 2 FSM R. 265, 267 (Pon. 1986) (citing Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 96 S. Ct. 1848, 48 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1976)) ("we must, of course, take as true the material facts alleged in petitioner's complaint")); 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 640-68 (3d ed. 2004) ("the question on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in the pleader's behalf" (emphasis added)).
2 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90, 96 (1974) ("The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims."); Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 529-30, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296, 179 L. Ed. 2d 233, 241-42 (2011) ("not whether [plaintiff] will ultimately prevail . . . but whether his complaint was sufficient to cross the federal court's threshold" (citation omitted)).
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