FSM SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION
Cite as Sigrah v. Moses 24 FSM R. 327 (Pon. 2023)
YOSLYN G. SIGRAH, JASON F. SIGRAH, MARUKO
T. SIGRAH and FIONA AULIVIA HEIN,
Petitioners,
vs.
ESMOND MOSES, in his official capacity as the
Speaker of the FSM Congress, THE TWENTY-THIRD
CONGRESS OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF
MICRONESIA, and AUSEN LAMBERT, Election
Director,
Respondents.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2023-018
ORDER GRANTING DECLARATORY RELIEF, SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE
Dennis L. Belcourt
Associate Justice
Hearing: November 1, 2023
Decided: November 2, 2023
APPEARANCES:
For the Petitioners:
Salomon M. Saimon, Esq.
P.O. Box 911
Kolonia, Pohnpei, FM 96941
Kathleen M. Burch, Esq.
P.O. Box 1365
Koror, Palau PW 96940
For the Respondents:
T. Lam Dang, Esq.
(Speaker & Congress)
Legislative Counsel
Yolanda Rondon, Esq.
Congress Staff Attorney
P.O. Box PS-3
Palikir, Pohnpei FM 96941
For the Respondent:
Leonito Bacalando, Jr., Esq.
(Lambert)
Josephine Leben James, Esq.
Marisha Jones
Assistant Attorneys General
FSM Department of Justice
P.O. Box PS-105
Palikir, Pohnpei FM 96941
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A motion for reconsideration will be denied when it lacks good grounds and when it was not really a motion to reconsider, as it is based on grounds completely unrelated to the motion to dismiss, and when the movant had not joined in the motion to dismiss whose denial he seeks to have reconsidered. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 331 & n.2 (Pon. 2023).
"Forum shopping" is choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim might be heard, but a court and an upcoming election are not competing forums, so the forum shopping argument is not applicable–not just because one is a court and the other is an election, but also because it would be unfair for the candidate to be compelled to elect between pursuing rights that derive from the July 4, 2023 election, and seeking to foreclose the possibility that she would face a new legal battle against the winning candidate from the upcoming election. Under these circumstances, the candidate's choice to contest the November 21, 2023 election cannot be said to be a waiver (or abandonment) of her right to pursue litigation. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 331 (Pon. 2023).
A request for Appellate Rule 5(a) permission to appeal a declaratory judgment will be denied because a declaratory judgment is immediately appealable, and because an interlocutory appeal would not materially advance the litigation's ultimate termination, but could possibly prolong it. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 331 (Pon. 2023).
The test whether the court can render a declaratory judgment is whether there is a case or dispute within the meaning of article XI, section 6(b) of the Constitution. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 332 (Pon. 2023).
A case must be one appropriate for judicial determination, that is, a justiciable controversy, as distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character, or one that is academic or moot. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 332 (Pon. 2023).
The granting of a declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, rests in the trial court's sound discretion exercised in the public interest. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 332 (Pon. 2023).
Standing and justiciability are threshold issues going to the court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus are addressed first. Standing must be found for each count of a complaint or that count will be dismissed. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 332 (Pon. 2023).
Ripeness is a threshold justiciability issue. For the FSM Supreme Court to exercise its jurisdiction, the issue raised must be ripe for adjudication. A matter is ripe when there is an actual, present controversy not merely a hypothetical or speculative conflict. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 332 (Pon. 2023).
There is an actual controversy when It is undisputed that a candidate received a plurality of the vote and that Congress has nevertheless refused to seat her. The dispute is actual, concrete, and touches on the legal relations of the two parties. It is neither hypothetical nor academic, and it is ripe for relief, since a special election to replace her has not yet happened and Congress has yet to seat another candidate. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 333 (Pon. 2023).
The Constitution uses the phrase "prescribe by statute" where a statute was intended in the grant of power to Congress and the phrase "provide by law" when a broader power of Congress to delegate the power to an administrative agency created by it, or to assign the power to the executive branch was intended. In some instances, the Constitution uses just "prescribe" to indicate that a statute is intended, and "provide" for the broader grant. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 333 (Pon. 2023).
Since the Constitution intended a narrow grant of authority to Congress whenever it used the word "prescribe," additional qualifications for Congress members can only be added by statute. The Constitution permits no other means. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 333 (Pon. 2023).
The separation-of-powers principle is found in the structure of the Constitution itself. The Constitution divides power into three branches and limits the powers and functions of each so that no one branch can usurp the other and assume autocratic power. This division of political authority into the executive, legislative, and judicial branch, protects the people's liberty through checks and balances and ensures the guarantees laid out in the Declaration of Rights. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 334 (Pon. 2023).
Congress is bound by the limitations found in the FSM's constitutional structure as well as the plain text of the Constitution itself. To the extent that an act exceeds this limitation, it is voId. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 334 (Pon. 2023).
Although Congress is the sole and final judge of qualifications of its members, it cannot make determinations outside of that limited scope of authority and to do otherwise is a violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 334 (Pon. 2023).
The Constitution's plain text commits solely to Congress's consideration only qualifications that are enumerated in the Constitution or prescribed by statute, and Congress has not enacted a statute to add a "character and fitness" qualification to be a member of Congress. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 334 (Pon. 2023).
When the Credentials Committee applied qualifications to a member-elect that are not enumerated in the Constitution and have not been enacted by statute and when Congress adopted the Credentials Committee Report both of those applications of qualifications that are not enumerated in the Constitution and have not been enacted by statute were in violation of the Constitution, invalid, and void ab initio to that extent, and Congress's act in judging that the members-elect satisfied the qualifications set out in the Constitution and in the statute was constitutional. Thus, Congress's act in judging that a member-elect was not qualified because of character and fitness concerns was unconstitutional and void ab initio because it was in conflict with the Constitution, also making the Speaker's declaration that there was a vacancy voId. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 335-36 (Pon. 2023).
Congress's adoption of the Credentials Committee's unconstitutional acts as its own acts does not make them constitutional, rather they remain in violation of the FSM Constitution, invalid, and void ab initio. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 336 (Pon. 2023).
When a ruling does not dispose of damage claims, any injunction that could be issued would need to be a preliminary injunction. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 336 (Pon. 2023).
When the court has granted declaratory relief that the declaration of vacancy and any ensuing election is void and when the parties can, without an injunction, comply, solely based on the court's declaration of unconstitutionality and their oath to uphold the Constitution, the court will await a reasonable time before reevaluating whether any action on its part concerning injunctive relief is warranted. Sigrah v. Moses, 24 FSM R. 327, 336 (Pon. 2023).
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DENNIS L. BELCOURT, Associate Justice:
On November 1, 2023, this Court held a hearing on Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. Esmond Moses, in his official capacity as Speaker of the 23rd Congress, ("Congress") was represented by Staff Attorney Yolanda Rondon and Legislative Counsel T. Lam Dang. Ausen Lambert, in his official capacity as Director of the Office of National Elections ("Election Director") was represented by Assistant Attorneys General Leonito Bacalando, Josephine Lebehn James and Marisha Jones.1 Petitioners were represented by Salomon Saimon and Kathleen Burch. Ms. Burch appeared remotely from Palau.
The Court addressed several preliminary matters, including: 1) entry of stipulated evidence, 2) the use of protective orders, and 3) the Election Director's Motion for Reconsideration or Permission to Appeal.2
A. Election Director's Motion for Reconsideration
The basis for the Election Director's motion was that Ms. Sigrah had submitted her petition as a candidate for the November 21, 2023 election without a reservation of right, and thus had waived [or] abandoned her right to pursue this litigation. Having reviewed the Election Director's motion, the Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration because it lacks good grounds. Isamu Nakasone Store v. David, 20 FSM R. 53, 56 (Pon. 2015) (court needs to find good grounds before it grants unopposed motion).
The Election Director cites as a basis for his waiver/abandonment argument is a contention that Ms. Sigrah is "forum shopping," i.e., "choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim might be heard." Tarauo v. Arsenal, 18 FSM R. 270, 274 (Chk. 2012) (forum shopping a possible basis for motion to dismiss without prejudice). This Court and the upcoming election are not competing fora, so the forum shopping argument is not applicable—not just because one is a court and the other is an election, but also because it would be unfair for Ms. Sigrah to be compelled to elect between pursuing rights that derive from the July 4, 2023 election, and seeking to foreclose the possibility that she would face a new legal battle against the winning candidate from the upcoming election. Under these circumstances, Ms. Sigrah's choice to contest the November 21, 2023 election cannot be said to be a waiver (or abandonment) of her right to pursue this litigation.
B. Permission to Appeal
Alternatively, the Election Director seeks permission to appeal under FSM Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a), which this Court may facilitate by amending the order to state that it is "of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.
I deny this request on the basis that a declaratory judgment is immediately appealable, 6 F.S.M.C. 1501, and given the current absence of an eligible Article XI, section 3 justice from the FSM, an interlocutory appeal would not "materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation," but could possibly prolong it. This assessment is borne out by the fact that the hearing on declaratory relief, with stipulated exhibits and one witness, took up less than an afternoon, hence the fear the Election Director has of delay is unwarranted.
A. Introduction
The evidentiary hearing was next held, at which Petitioners offered Exhibits 1-5 into the record, and Congress offered Exhibits A, B, F, H, P, Q, R and S, followed by Exhibit G, with resolutions amending that document, which was submitted on November 2, 2023. All of said exhibits are stipulated to as to admissibility by the parties (as represented at the November 1, 2023 hearing), and all of said exhibits are hereby admitted into evidence. One witness, member-elect Sigrah, testified.
B. Authority for Relief
Pursuant to FSM Civil Rule 57 provides as follows:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, the court, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the right and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such. The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar.
(See also Special Proceedings Title 6 Chapter 15).3 "The test whether the court can render a declaratory judgment is whether there is a case or dispute within the meaning of article XI, section 6(b) of the Constitution." Dorval Tankship Pty. Ltd. v. Department of Finance, 8 FSM R. 111, 115 (Chk. 1997). See Kallop v. Pohnpei, 18 FSM R. 130, 133 (Pon. 2011); Ponape Chamber of Commerce v. Nett Mun. Gov't, 1 FSM R. 389, 400 (Pon. 1984).
FSM Constitution, Article XI, section 6(b), states,
The national courts, including the trial division of the Supreme Court, have concurrent original jurisdiction in cases arising under this Constitution; national law or treaties; and in disputes between a state and a citizen of another state, between citizens of different states, and between a state or a citizen thereof, and a foreign state, citizen, or subject.
"United States courts have held that the term 'cases' is practically indistinguishable from its companion word 'controversies,' with the possible exception that 'controversies' might include only suits of a civil nature and therefore may be less comprehensive than 'cases.'" Ponape Chamber of Commerce, 1 FSM R. at 401. "A case must be one 'appropriate for judicial determination,' that is, a 'justiciable controversy,' as distinguished from a 'difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character,' or one that is 'academic or moot.' The controversy must be 'definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'" Id. "Additionally, "the granting of a declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, 'rests in the sound discretion of the trial court exercised in the public interest.'" FSM v. GMP Hawaii, Inc., 17 FSM R. 555, 567 (Pon. 2011).
Standing and justiciability are threshold issues going to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus are addressed first. See Eighth Kosrae Legislature v. FSM Dev. Bank, 11 FSM R. 491, 496 (Kos. 2003). "Standing must be found for each count of [a] complaint or that count will be dismissed. Ripeness is also a threshold justiciability issue." Sipos v. Crabtree, 13 FSM R. 355, 362 (Pon. 2005). "For the Court to exercise its jurisdiction, the issue raised must be ripe for adjudication. A matter is ripe when there is an actual, present controversy not merely a hypothetical or speculative conflict." Kallop, 18 FSM R. at 133.
The Court finds that there is an actual controversy in this case between a citizen and the state. It is undisputed that Ms. Sigrah received a plurality of the vote and that Congress has nevertheless refused to seat her. The dispute is actual, concrete, and touches on the legal relations of the two parties. It is neither hypothetical nor academic. The Court further finds that it is ripe for relief, the special election has not yet happened and Congress has yet to seat another candidate. Additionally, this Court previously determined that the political issue doctrine does not bar judicial review of Congressional action which has exceeded its scope of authority under the Constitution.
FSM Constitution Article IX, § 9 states:
A person is ineligible to be a member of Congress unless he is at least 30 years of age on the day of election and has been a citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia for at least 15 years, and a resident of the state from which he is elected for at least 5 years. A person convicted of a felony by a state or national government court is ineligible to be a member of Congress. The Congress may modify this provision or prescribe additional qualifications; knowledge of the English language may not be a qualification.
(emphasis added). In the Journal of the Constitutional Convention the Committee on Style and Arrangement explains the use of the words "provide and prescribe" in detail:
There are many instances throughout the Constitution where Congress is authorized to "provide by law" for various things. In some instances it seemed clear to your Committee that the intention was that Congress should enact a statute. In other instances a broader grant of power was intended and Congress could delegate the power to an administrative agency created by it, or assign the power to the executive branch. To distinguish these two, your Committee used the phrase "prescribe by statute" where a statute was intended and the phrase "provide by law" when a broader power was intended. In some instances your Committee used a shorthand method, using "prescribe" to indicate that a statute was intended, and "provide" for the broader grant.
SCREP No. 67, II J. of Micro. Con. Con. 891, 892 (emphasis added). The Constitutional Convention intended a narrow grant of authority whenever it used the word "prescribe." Accordingly, additional qualifications could only be added by statute. No other means were permitted under the Constitution.4 SCREP No. 67 was accepted by the Convention on November 8, 1975, as a report on the draft of the Constitution, right before that draft was approved by the Convention. I J. Micro. Con. Con. 557. Therefore, I find it to be the best evidence of the meaning of "prescribe" as that word is used in Article IX, section 9 of the Constitution. While Congress may prescribe qualifications for members of Congress in addition to those set forth in Article IX, section 9, those additions must be by statute.
FSM Constitution, Article IX § 17(a), states: "The Congress shall be the sole judge of the elections and qualifications of its members, may discipline a member, and, by 2/3 vote, may suspend or expel a member." (emphasis added). The Journal of the Constitutional Convention's records the intention that:
This provision is consistent with the existing power of Congress of Micronesia to be the final judge of the selection and qualifications of its own members, and is consistent with precedent in many other countries. The final decision of whether or not to seat a member of Congress is felt to be a political one and thus inappropriate for the judicial branch of government.
SCREP No. 36, II J. of Micro. Con. Con. 823, 847 (emphasis added).
The principle of Separation of Powers is found in the structure of the Constitution itself. The constitution divided power into three branches and limited the powers and functions of each so that no one could usurp the other and assume autocratic power. This division of political authority into the executive, legislative, and judicial branch, protects the liberty of the people through checks and balances and ensures the guarantees laid out in the Declaration of Rights.5 Specifically, due process6 and equal protection.7 As well as the right to suffrage.8 Ultimately, the requirement that Congress prescribe by statute any qualifications for its members safeguards the electoral process and ensures the right to have a personal representative in Congress. Congress is bound by the limitations found in the FSM's constitutional structure as well as the plain text of the constitution itself. To the extent that an act exceeds this limitation, it is void ab initio.
The FSM Constitution, Article II, section 1, states:
This Constitution is the expression of the sovereignty of the people and is the supreme law of the Federated States of Micronesia. An act of the Government in conflict with this Constitution is invalid to the extent of conflict.
(emphasis added). Thus, although Congress is the sole and final judge of qualifications of its members, it cannot make determinations outside of that limited scope of authority and to do otherwise is a violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Accordingly, this Court declares the following:
1) The plain text of the FSM Constitution commits solely to Congress's consideration only qualifications that are enumerated in the FSM Constitution or prescribed by statute.
2) The qualifications for a member of Congress enumerated in the FSM Constitution are that a Senator: (1) must be "at least 30 years of age on the day of the election;" (2) "has been a citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia for at least 15 years;" (3) "a resident of the state from which he is elected for at least 5 years," and (4) not "convicted of a felony by a state or national government court." FSM Const. art. IX, § 9.
3) The qualifications for a member of Congress enacted by statute are that a Senator must: (1) "have attained the age of 30 years by Election Day"; (2) "be a Resident for at least five years of the State from which he is elected"; (3) "be a citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia for at least 15 years"; (4) "not be under a judgment of mental incompetency or insanity"; and (5) "not have been convicted of a felony by a State or National Court of the Federated States of Micronesia or its predecessor Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands." 9 F.S.M.C. 201.
4) The FSM Congress has not enacted a statute to add a "character and fitness" qualification to be a member of Congress.
5) The National Election Director certified that Yoslyn G. Sigrah won the Special Election held on July 4, 2023 for the four-year at-large seat from Kosrae.
6) The Committee on Credentials issued its Report regarding the Members-Elect Credentials of the Special Election Held on July 4, 2023, dated September 28,2023 ("Credentials Report').
7) The Committee on Credentials found that the Office of National Election certified that both members-elect met the eligibility requirements under Article IX, § 9, and 9 F.S.M.C. 201 of the FSM Code. Credentials Report at 5-6.
8) The Office of National Election requested a mental competency check for each candidate from the FSM Department of Health, who certified the "mental competency of all candidates." Credentials Report at 5.
9) The Office of the National Election requested criminal background checks on all candidates with the FSM Department of Justice, FSM Supreme Court, state attorneys general and state supreme courts.
10) The Committee on Credentials found that "[a]ll State Police Chiefs certified that both members-elect did not have any felony convictions." Credentials Report at 6.
11) The Committee on Credentials found that the "FSM Supreme Court certified that both members-elect did not have any felony convictions and no pardons for felony convictions." Credentials Report at 6.
12) The Committee on Credentials found that "[a]ll State Supreme Courts certified that both members-elect do not have any felony convictions." Credentials Report at 6.
13) The Committee on Credentials did not recommend that Yoslyn Sigrah be seated as a member of the FSM Congress "due to the character and fitness concerns raised." Credentials Report at 7.
14) The Committee on Credentials applied qualifications to Member-elect Sigrah that are not enumerated in the FSM Constitution and have not been enacted by statute. Credentials Report at 7, 9.
15) The Committee on Credentials' application of qualifications that are not enumerated in the FSM Constitution and have not been enacted by statute is in violation of the FSM Constitution, invalid, and void ab initio. FSM Const. art. II, § 1.
16) On September 28, 2023, a quorum of eight9 members of Congress were present and adopted the Committee on Credentials Report. Day 17 YouTube Video at 23:21-24:02 (Exhibits 1 and 2).
17) By adopting the Credentials Report, Congress judged that Senators-elect Fabian Nimea and Yoslyn Sigrah satisfied the qualifications set out in Article IX, § 9 of the FSM Constitution and 9 F.S.M.C. 201.
18) Congress adoption of the unconstitutional acts of the Committee on Credentials as its own acts does not make them constitutional, rather they remain in violation of the FSM Constitution, invalid, and void ab initio. See FSM Const. art. II, § 1.
19) On the other hand, Congress's act is only "invalid to the extent of the conflict" with the FSM Constitution. FSM Const. art. II, § 1.
20) Congress's act in judging that members-elect Fabian Nimea and Yoslyn Sigrah satisfied the qualifications set out in Article IX, § 9 of the FSM Constitution and 9 F.S.M.C. 201 of the FSM Code is constitutional.
21) Congress's act in judging that member-elect Sigrah was not qualified because of character and fitness concerns is unconstitutional and void ab initio because it is in conflict with the FSM Constitution. See FSM Const. art. II, § 1; FSM Const. art. IX, § 9.
22) Congress's adoption of those portions of the Committee on Credentials' September 28, 2023 Credentials Report within the scope of the FSM Constitution is final. FSM Congress Official Rules of Procedure (Rules), Rule 1, Section 8(a) ("The adoption of the report or reports of the Credentials Committee by the Congress shall be final.").10
23) The Speaker's declaration of a vacancy in the 4-year at-large seat for Congress is void; there is a member-elect, whom the National Election Director has declared the winner and whom Congress has determined qualified, but has not yet been seated.
24) To be seated, all that remains is for Member-elect Sigrah to take the oath of office administered by any Justice of the FSM Supreme Court or the Speaker of the FSM Congress. No further Congressional discretion is required.11
Petitioners request that the conduct of the November 21, 2023 election be enjoined. As this ruling does not dispose of damage claims, such injunction need be preliminary by reason of controlling case law, Andrew v. Heirs of Seymour, 19 FSM R. 331, 337 (App 2014). On this Court's determination that actions associated with the upcoming election, the orders associated with the election can be ceased without an injunction, solely based on the declaration of unconstitutionality, by all parties bound by the oath. As the declaration of vacancy is void, so is the ensuing election. This Court will await a reasonable time as that process is stopped by the Election Director and reevaluate whether any further action on its part is warranted.
With this declaratory relief, aside from the preliminary injunction set forth above, this Court takes no injunctive action, and merely declare the rights of the parties with the least intrusive remedy available to the Court so as to avoid as much intergovernmental conflict as possible. By the same token, it is taken on faith that Congress will faithfully execute its role. The oath of office, which they have all sworn to uphold, states as follows:
I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of Senator of the Federated States of Micronesia, and will, to the best of my ability, uphold, promote, and support the laws and the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, so help me God.
Section 9 of Rule 1 of the Official Rules of Procedure of the Twenty-Third Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia (emphasis added). See also 3 F.S.M.C. 301. "On assuming office, all public officials shall take an oath to uphold, promote, and support the laws and the Constitution as prescribed by statute."12
Upon CONSIDERATION of the arguments presented, and of the papers filed, the Court grants this DECLARATORY RELIEF to Ms. Sigrah. A status conference is scheduled for follow-up on remaining matters for November 7, 2023 at 3:30 pm at Palikir; attorneys not on Pohnpei may appear remotely on request to the Clerk's Office.
_______________________________Footnotes:
1 Jones was granted permission to appear pro hac vice under the supervision of Ms. Leben James with no objections.
2 Motion to Reconsider Order dated 26 October as amended by 31 October 2023 Order, and/or in the alternative Motion for a Court Statement of Opinion Permitting Interlocutory Appeal from Order dated 26 October 2023 per FSM App. R. 5(a), filed on behalf of Ausen Lambert in his capacity as National Election Director. It should be noted that this was not really a motion to reconsider, as it is based on grounds completely unrelated to the motion to dismiss. Moreover, it appears from the record that the Election Director did not join in the motion to dismiss whose denial he seeks to have reconsidered.
3 See 6 F.S.M.C. 1501, Special Proceedings, which states: In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, the High Court or a District Court, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such. Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.
4 If the members of the convention had intended a broader grant of authority, or to have permitted other means, they would have used the word "provide".SCREP No. 67, II J. of Micro. Con. Con. 891, 892.
5 FSM Const. art. IV, §§ 1-13.
6 "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or be denied the equal protection of the laws." FSM Const. art. IV, § 3.
7 "Equal protection of the laws may not be denied or impaired on account of sex, race, ancestry, national origin, language, or social status." FSM Const. art. IV, § 4.
8 FSM Constitution, article VI, § 1 entitled "suffrage" states, in part "[a] citizen 18 years of age may vote in national elections." Within this innocuous phrase is expressed the right to vote. Ultimately, "[t]he people should choose whom they please to govern them." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547, 89 S. Ct. 1944, 1977, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491, 531 (1969). "[T]his principle is undermined as much by limiting whom the people can select as by limiting the franchise itself." Id. "To allow essentially that same power to be exercised under the guise of judging qualifications, would be . . . investing an improper and dangerous power in the Legislature." Id.
9 A quorum is eight members. Rule 3. A majority of a quorum is required to approve a credential committee report. Rule 10, section 10. In contrast a motion to expel a member requires ten votes. Rule 4, section 12. Exhibit 1 is the Committee on Credentials Report, dated September 28, 2023, which is a public record. Exhibit 2 is the recording of Day 17 Congressional hearing in which the Credential's Committee Report was adopted by Congress which was stipulated to on October 30, 2023. An authenticated copy of the FSM Congress live streaming video is a public record, on file with the court, but also available on Youtube entitled "23rd CFSM 2nd Regular Session Day 17."
10 See FSM Const. art. IX, § 17(a); See SCREP No. 36, II J. of Micro. Con. Con. 823, 847.
11 FSM Congress Official Rules of Procedure, Rule 1, § 9 and Rule 2, § 2(k); FSM Const. art. XIII, § 7.
12 FSM Const. art. XIII, § 7 (emphasis added).
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