[24 FSM R. 148]

APPEAL CASE NO. P2-2018

Decided: June 6, 2023

BEFORE:

Hon. Beauleen Carl-Worswick, Associate Justice, FSM Supreme Court
Hon. Larry Wentworth, Associate Justice, FSM Supreme Court
Hon. Dennis L. Belcourt, Associate Justice, FSM Supreme Court

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:     Vincent Kallop, Esq.
                                 Micronesian Legal Service Corporation
                                 P.O. Box 129
                                 Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941

HEADNOTES

Appellate Review – Parties

The propriety of naming the Court of Land Tenure, ostensibly the court appealed from, as the defendant is doubtful when the appellant seeks to correct that court's alleged legal error. The missing landowners or land claimants are indispensable parties, and should be named as the defendants. Otherwise, it would be improper for any court, to exercise jurisdiction over the appellant's claims. Yoma v. Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure, 24 FSM R. 148, 150 (App. 2023).

Appellate Review – Decisions Reviewable; Jurisdiction – Subject-Matter

FSM Constitutional due process claims would give the FSM Supreme Court appellate division subject-matter jurisdiction over an appeal from the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division. Yoma v. Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure, 24 FSM R. 148, 150 (App. 2023).

Appellate Review – Parties; Constitutional Law – Due Process; Property – Registered Land

Due process requires that, in any litigation to recover an interest in land, the current holder of that interest must be a party to the litigation. The litigant must make the current titleholders (or if an heirship proceeding is pending, the other claimants) parties to any litigation to obtain or recover ownership of the land. Yoma v. Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure, 24 FSM R. 148, 150 (App. 2023).

Appellate Review – Dismissal; Appellate Review – Parties

The FSM Supreme Court appellate division will dismiss an appeal when the indispensable parties were never part of the litigation below. This dismissal is without prejudice to any future litigation against those indispensable parties in a court of competent jurisdiction. Yoma v. Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure, 24 FSM R. 148, 151 (App. 2023).

COURT'S OPINION

PER CURIAM:

For the reasons given below, we dismiss this appeal for the lack of indispensable and necessary parties and without prejudice to any further action against those parties in a court of competent jurisdiction.

I.

Madio Primo owned Land Parcel No. 089-A-02, Awakpah, U. Ansely Yoma contends that on December 10, 1992, Primo made an inter vivos conveyance by deed of a part of Land Parcel No. 089-A-02 to her, his eldest daughter. Sometime later, Primo died. An heirship proceeding for the estate of Madio Primo was started in the Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure. Attempts were made in 1999 to have the transfer to Ansely Yoma acknowledged in the heirship proceeding and property plat records in the Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure. These did not succeed.

Yoma later filed this case in the Pohnpei Supreme Court trial division, alleging that, because of this, her property rights and due process rights had been denied by the Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure. The Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure was the sole named defendant. That case was dismissed and the dismissal was appealed to the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division. The Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division dismissed the appeal, which dismissal was then, on May 3, 2018, appealed to this court, naming the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division as the appellee and the Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure as the real party in interest. Yoma contends that her constitutional due process rights were violated by both the named appellee and named real party in interest.

II.

On August 20, 2021, Chief Justice Dennis K. Yamase issued an Order Correcting Caption; Order for Status Conference, Yoma v. Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure, 23 FSM R. 386 (App. 2021), in which he set forth certain problems with the procedural posture, the designation of parties, and the absence of the persons who either held title to, or actively claimed, the land Yoma seeks title to. (It is unclear whether the Court of Land Tenure heirship proceeding is still pending or whether it has concluded and new owners issued title.) After the Chief Justice's retirement, this appeal remained dormant.

On March 10, 2023, Yoma again moved for a status conference. The Acting Chief Justice then issued, on April 18, 2023, an Order for Briefing from the Parties. That single justice order noted that the appeal's progress was hindered by the lack of a Pohnpei Supreme Court record; noted that the current registered landowners were absent from the litigation; noted the principle that the court appealed from should not be named as a party-defendant; and required the parties to submit, within 30 days, a brief addressing whether this appeal is properly before this court given that the only named party-defendant is the Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure.

Yoma filed her brief on May 17, 2023. No other brief was filed. Her brief contained copies of Primo's 1992 inter vivos deed to Ansely Yoma and 1999 correspondence between the Pohnpei Department of Resource Management and Development and the Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure about changing the land records to show Yoma's purported ownership. Yoma contends that "the appellee" promised to correct its error but never did, so she "went up the Pohnpei State Court of Land Tenure, Supreme Court Trial Division and the Appellate Division seeking redress for violation of property right and due process." Yoma then argues that, since all those courts denied her claims and since governmental bodies' decisions concerning property rights are subject to the FSM Constitution's procedural due process requirements, FSM Const. art. IV, § 3, her appeal is now properly before the FSM Supreme Court appellate division. Yoma did not address the current landowners' or current land claimants' absence from this litigation.

III.

We seriously doubt the propriety of naming the Court of Land Tenure, ostensibly the court appealed from, as the defendant since Yoma seeks to correct that court's alleged legal error. Alik v. Heirs of Alik, 21 FSM R. 606, 620 (App. 2018) (a court is not a proper party – a real party in interest – to any dispute over title to land); Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 579 (App. 2018) (not proper to make the lower court a defendant when seeking judicial review of its actions in a higher court); Allen v. Allen, 17 FSM R. 35, 40 (App. 2010). We conclude that the missing landowners or land claimants are indispensable parties, see, e.g., Anton v. Heirs of Shrew, 12 FSM R. 274, 279 (App. 2003) (all owners are indispensable parties to the litigation when someone else claims complete ownership of the land), and should have been named as the defendants. Otherwise, it would be improper for us, or for any other court, to exercise jurisdiction over Yoma's claims.

Yoma asserts that we have jurisdiction because FSM Constitutional due process rights are alleged to have been violated, and she has sought and been denied those rights at every step in the courts below. Yoma is correct that the FSM Constitutional due process claims would give us subject-matter jurisdiction over an appeal from the Pohnpei Supreme Court appellate division. FSM Const. art. XI, § 7.

However, due process also requires that, in any litigation to recover an interest in land, the current holder of that interest must be a party to the litigation. Anton, 12 FSM R. at 279 (if current owner not party to the litigation, he could be deprived of his property interest without due process of law); Setik v. Pacific Int'l, Inc., 17 FSM R. 304, 306 (Chk. 2010) (any action that seeks to claim an interest in land for which a certificate of title or a determination of ownership has been issued, must, at a minimum, name the registered titleholders parties); Marcus v. Truk Trading Corp., 11 FSM R. 152, 158 n.4 (Chk. 2002) (due process requires that in any lawsuit to remove someone's name from a certificate of title that person is an indispensable party); Ruben v. Hartman, 15 FSM R. 100, 110 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2007) (in any lawsuit to change the registered ownership of land, due process requires that the certificate titleholder is an indispensable party); Dereas v. Eas, 14 FSM R. 446, 454 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2006) (court cannot set aside or nullify a person's certificate of title when that person is not a party before the court because that would violate every notion of due process of law); See also Alik, 21 FSM R. at 620 (litigation to recover title to land "can only be done by an action against the current registered owner" or his heirs, if deceased); Allen, 17 FSM R. at 40 (only a successful suit against the current titleholder, a necessary and indispensable party to any suit over title, can result in the land title's transfer to the successful plaintiff). Otherwise, any favorable judgment that Yoma obtained would be subject to collateral attack. See, e.g., Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM R. 508, 517 (Pon. 1994) (failure to join an indispensable party may subject a judgment to collateral attack); Ruben, 15 FSM R. at 109-10 (judgment is void and subject to collateral attack when indispensable parties were not joined).

Since Yoma's objective is to have the Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure grant her registered title to the land she believes she owns, Yoma must make the current titleholders (or if the heirship proceeding is still pending, the other claimants) parties to any litigation to obtain or recover ownership of the land. She has not.

IV.

Therefore, we must dismiss this appeal because the necessary and indispensable parties were never part of the litigation below. This dismissal is without prejudice to any future litigation against those indispensable parties in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Footnotes:

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