FSM SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION

Cite as FSM v. Benedicto, 21 FSM R. 377(Chk. 2017)

[21 FSM R. 377]

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CORTEZ BENEDICTO and RIETA ERAM,

Defendants.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2015-1513

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ACQUIT

Larry Wentworth
Associate Justice

Decided: October 26, 2017

[21 FSM R. 378]

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff:          Craig D. Refner, Esq.
                                   Assistant Attorney General
                                   FSM Department of Justice
                                   P.O. Box PS-105
                                   Palikir, Pohnpei FM 96941

For the Defendant:     Lorrie Johnson-Asher, Esq.
                                   Chief Public Defender
                                   Office of the Public Defender
                                   P.O. Box 1736
                                   Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941

*    *    *    *

HEADNOTES

Criminal Law and Procedure – Motions for Acquittal

Although the failure to oppose a motion is generally deemed a consent to that motion, the court, even with no opposition, still needs good grounds before it can grant a motion for acquittal. FSM v. Benedicto, 21 FSM R. 377, 379 (Chk. 2017).

Criminal Law and Procedure – Motions for Acquittal

When a defendant rests without putting on a defense, the sole basis for moving for acquittal, or raising the point on appeal, is that the government has failed to establish a prima facie case. In this context, the "prima facie" is used to denote evidence which, if believed, would be sufficient to establish a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. FSM v. Benedicto, 21 FSM R. 377, 379 (Chk. 2017).

Criminal Law and Procedure – Motions for Acquittal

The court's standard of review in considering a renewed motion for acquittal under Criminal Rule 29(c) is whether the evidence could "sustain" a conviction, i.e., such evidence that reasonable persons could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is not a requirement that the evidence compel, but only that it is capable of or sufficient to persuade the factfinder to reach a verdict of guilt by the requisite standard. FSM v. Benedicto, 21 FSM R. 377, 379 (Chk. 2017).

Criminal Law and Procedure – Human Trafficking

The human trafficking statute does not include the word "material" when describing benefits (it just says, "payments or benefits"). FSM v. Benedicto, 21 FSM R. 377, 380 (Chk. 2017).

Criminal Law and Procedure – Human Trafficking

The human trafficking statute reads in the disjunctive ("or"), not the conjunctive ("and"). For a guilty finding, it requires proof of the "giving or receiving of payments or benefits." It does not require that any one defendant do both the giving and receiving. FSM v. Benedicto, 21 FSM R. 377, 380 (Chk. 2017).

Criminal Law and Procedure – Human Trafficking

The prosecution does not have to prove a human trafficking defendant guilty of both giving and receiving payments and benefits. Finding the defendant guilty of the giving of payments or benefits is sufficient (although arguably he received the "benefit" of sex). FSM v. Benedicto, 21 FSM R. 377, 380 (Chk. 2017).

[21 FSM R. 379]

Criminal Law and Procedure – Motions for Acquittal

The court will deny a renewed motion for acquittal when, not only are most of the witness-victim's testimonial inconsistencies minor, they are immaterial, and when the prosecution established a prima facie case because there was sufficient evidence that reasonable persons could find the defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt – there was sufficient evidence to persuade a factfinder to reach a guilty verdict. FSM v. Benedicto, 21 FSM R. 377, 380 (Chk. 2017).

*    *    *    *

COURT'S OPINION

LARRY WENTWORTH, Associate Justice:

After the prosecution rested on October 6, 2017, defendant Cortez Benedicto made a Rule 29(a) motion for acquittal. The court denied that motion from the bench. The defense then rested. The court, after closing arguments, found Benedicto guilty of the offenses charged in Count I (human trafficking, 11 F.S.M.C. 615) and Count IV (trafficking in children, 11 F.S.M.C. 616), and acquitted him of the offense in Count V (11 F.S.M.C. 617(12) and 617(13)).

On October 13, 2017, Benedicto timely filed his Rule 29(c) Motion for Judgment of Acquittal after Finding of Guilt. The prosecution did not file an opposition. Although the failure to oppose a motion is generally deemed a consent to that motion, FSM Crim. R. 45(d), the court, even with no opposition, still needs good grounds before it can grant the motion. FSM v. Semwen, 18 FSM R. 222, 224 (Chk. 2012); FSM v. Phillip, 17 FSM R. 595, 597 (Pon. 2011); FSM v. Suzuki, 17 FSM R. 114, 115 (Chk. 2010).

I. STANDARD

The appellate division has fairly laid out the standard that the court must use in deciding whether this motion has good grounds.

Where defendant rests without putting on a defense, the sole basis for moving for acquittal, or raising the point on appeal, is that the government has failed to establish a prima facie case. In this context the term "prima facie" is used to denote evidence which, if believed, would be sufficient to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Andohn v. FSM, 1 FSM R. 433, 439 (App. 1984). The trial court has followed the Andohn court's instruction and guidance.

The standard of review that a court uses in considering a renewed motion for acquittal under Criminal Rule 29(c) is

whether the evidence could "sustain" a conviction, i.e., such evidence that reasonable persons could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is not a requirement that the evidence compel, but only that it is capable of or sufficient to persuade the [factfinder] to reach a verdict of guilt by the requisite standard.

FSM v. Fritz, 13 FSM R. 85, 86 (Chk. 2004) (quoting Andohn v. FSM, 1 FSM R. 433, 442 (App. 1984)) (emphasis in original). The court will apply the Andohn standard in this case.

[21 FSM R. 380]

II. BENEDICTO'S CONTENTIONS

Benedicto first contends that he should be acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove an essential element of the offense – that Benedicto obtained "financial or other material benefit from the prostitution of another person." Mot. at [unnumbered] 3 (Oct. 13, 2017).

Benedicto misreads the statute. Although the statute does not include the word "material" when describing benefits (it just says, "payments or benefits"), there are sounder grounds to reject this argument. The statute reads in the disjunctive ("or"), not the conjunctive ("and"). For a guilty finding, it requires proof of the "giving or receiving of payments or benefits." 11 F.S.M.C. 615. It does not require that any one defendant do both the giving and receiving. Logically, if one person is giving payments or benefits, someone else must be the one receiving payments or benefits.

Benedicto was charged with (and found guilty of) the giving, not the receiving, of payments or benefits. Under the statute that is sufficient. The prosecution did not have to prove him guilty of both giving and receiving payments and benefits (although arguably he did receive the "benefit" of sex). The prosecution only had to prove that he did one or the other – gave or received payments or benefits. It proved that he gave.

Benedicto further contends that certain inconsistencies in the victim-witness's testimony require that he be acquitted. After a review of the evidence, the court cannot agree. Not only are most of the inconsistencies minor, they are immaterial. The court therefore concludes that the prosecution established a prima facie case because there was sufficient evidence that reasonable persons could find Benedicto guilty beyond reasonable doubt – there was sufficient evidence to persuade a factfinder to reach a guilty verdict. That being so, the court must deny Benedicto's motion. Andohn, 1 FSM R. at 442.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Cortez Benedicto's renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal is denied.

*    *    *    *