FSM SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION
Cite as FSM v. Sonis, 18 FSM Intrm. 620 (Chk. 2013)
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MESEWIN SONIS,
Defendant.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2012-1509
ORDER DENYING ACQUITTAL
Ready E. Johnny
Associate Justice
Trial: February 21-22, March 12, 2013
Decided: March 19, 2013
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:
Sabino S. Asor, Esq.
Attorney General
Ken Uehara, State Prosecutor
Office of the Chuuk Attorney General
P.O. Box 1050
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942
For the Defendant:
Bethwell O'Sonis, Esq.
Office of the Public Defender
P.O. Box 754
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942
* * * *
The standard used in considering a Rule 29(a) motion for acquittal is not whether the evidence is insufficient for the court to find that each of the elements of the crimes the accused is charged with committing was proven beyond a reasonable doubt and the question is not whether the government has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the proper question is whether the evidence could "sustain" a conviction, i.e., such evidence that reasonable persons could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is not a requirement that the evidence compel, but only that it is capable of or sufficient to persuade the factfinder to reach a verdict of guilt by the requisite standard. FSM v. Sonis, 18 FSM Intrm. 620, 621 (Chk. 2013).
Under 11 F.S.M.C. 1003(2), in order to be exempt from criminal liability for possession of a
firearm, the court must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm is: 1) unserviceable; 2) incapable of being fired or discharged; and 3) being kept as a curio, ornament, or for its historical value. All three of these requirements must be satisfied for this exemption to apply, and if any one of them is not met, this exception does not apply. FSM v. Sonis, 18 FSM Intrm. 620, 622 (Chk. 2013).
When there is evidence before the court from which the court can infer that the handgun was serviceable – testimony of two officers that they had tried to and did get the firearm to work and from that evidence the court could infer that the handgun was capable of being fired or discharged; and when, from the circumstances under which the firearm was found and where it was found, abandoned by the accused in a mop bucket at Chuuk International Airport (right where he told the police he left it), the court could infer that he was not keeping the handgun as a curio, or as an ornament, or for its historical value but that his possession of the handgun must have been for some other reason. FSM v. Sonis, 18 FSM Intrm. 620, 622 (Chk. 2013).
The firearm statute's purpose cannot be evaded by such simple expedients as dismantling the weapon, maintaining weapons and ammunition in separate places, removing one easily replaceable part, or other similar ploys. Under the statute, current operability is not an essential element of the crime of possession of a firearm. FSM v. Sonis, 18 FSM Intrm. 620, 622 (Chk. 2013).
When there is evidence that could sustain a conviction because there is evidence that reasonable persons could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt on each of the counts, a motion to acquit will be denied for each count. FSM v. Sonis, 18 FSM Intrm. 620, 622 (Chk. 2013).
* * * *
READY E. JOHNNY, Associate Justice:
On March 12, 2013, after completing its witness testimony, the prosecution rested and the defendant, Mesewin Sonis, moved for acquittal under Criminal Procedure Rule 29(a) and asked that he be permitted to submit that motion in writing by Thursday. This therefore comes before the court on the defendant's Motion for Acquittal, filed on March 14, 2013, and the prosecution's opposition filed on March 18, 2013.
Mesewin Sonis moves for acquittal on the ground that the evidence is insufficient for the court to find that each of the elements of the crimes he is charged with committing was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. That, however, is not the standard that a court uses in considering a motion for acquittal under Criminal Rule 29(a).
The question is not whether the government has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt to the factfinder. Instead, the proper question is whether the evidence could "sustain" a conviction, i.e., such evidence that reasonable persons could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is not a requirement that the evidence compel, but only that it is capable of or sufficient to persuade the [factfinder] to reach a verdict of guilt by the requisite standard.
Andohn v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 433, 442 (App. 1984) (emphasis in original). With this reasonable factfinder standard in mind, the court turns to the consideration of each count.
Count II charges the illegal possession of a handgun. Sonis contends that an essential element of this charge that was not proven is that the prosecution must show that the firearm was in serviceable condition and capable of being fired. Sonis further contends, relying on Ludwig v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 27, 37 (App. 1985), that the court cannot just presume that Sonis was not keeping the firearm as a curio, ornament, or for historical significance and since the prosecution did not show the firearm's current operability, he must be acquitted. Sonis contends that current operability should be shown by the government as a standard procedure.
Under 11 F.S.M.C. 1003(2), in order to be exempt from criminal liability for possession of a firearm, the court must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that "the firearm is: (1) unserviceable; (2) incapable of being fired or discharged; and (3) being kept as a curio, ornament or for its historical value." Ludwig, 2 FSM Intrm. at 37-38. All three of these requirements must be satisfied for this exemption to apply. FSM v. Meitou, 18 FSM Intrm. 121, 129 (Chk. 2011). If any one requirement is not met, this exception does not apply. Id.
There is evidence before the court from which the court can infer that the handgun was serviceable – testimony of two officers that they had tried to and did get the firearm to work. From that evidence the court could infer that the handgun was capable of being fired or discharged. And from the circumstances under which the firearm was found and where it was found, abandoned by Sonis in a mop bucket at Chuuk International Airport (right where Sonis told the police he left it), the court could infer that Sonis was not keeping the handgun as a curio, or as an ornament, or for its historical value but that his possession of the handgun must have been for some other reason.
Furthermore, the statute's purpose cannot be evaded "by such simple expedients as dismantling the weapon, maintaining weapons and ammunition in separate places, removing one easily replaceable part, or other similar ploys. Under the statute, current operability is not an essential element of the crime of possession of a firearm." Ludwig, 2 FSM Intrm. at 34.
Accordingly, since there is evidence that could sustain a conviction because there is evidence that reasonable persons could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the motion to acquit is denied for Count II.
Sonis contends that he should be acquitted on this charge because none of the prosecution's witnesses testified that they actually saw Sonis hold or use a firearm. There was, however, testimony by a student and her mother that Sonis threatened to shoot them at Mwan Elementary School and Sonis's statement, admitted into evidence, that he had the gun with him at the time he threatened the two.
Accordingly, since there is evidence that could sustain a conviction on Count I, the motion to acquit is denied for Count I.
Mesewin Sonis's motion for acquittal is therefore denied. Sonis may present his defense.
* * * *