*    *    *    *

HEADNOTES

*    *    *    *

COURT'S OPINION

MARTIN G. YINUG, Chief Justice:

I. BACKGROUND

This matter comes before the court on several motions filed in the autumn of 2011. The plaintiffs filed the complaint as a class action on July 8, 2011. On September 23, 2011, the defendants filed an opposition to the certification of the complaint as a class action, as well as an answer. On October 11, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify them as a class. On October 13, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a first request for production of documents. On October 21, 2011, the defendants filed an opposition to the plaintiffs' motion to certify the complaint as a class action. On October 25, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to abstain. On November 14, 2011, the defendants filed their response to the plaintiffs' request for production of documents, as well as a motion for a protective order. On November 16, 2011, the defendants requested a hearing. On November 23, 2011, the plaintiffs moved this court for an enlargement of time to respond to the defendants' motion for a protective order. On November 28, 2011, the court granted the motion for enlargement, giving the plaintiffs until December 7, 2011 to file their response, and the plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to abstain. On December 5, 2011, the defendants filed a response to the opposition to the motion to abstain.

[18 FSM R. 102]

II. ANALYSIS

The complaint states that this court has jurisdiction over this matter under article XI, section 6(b) of the Constitution, which confers upon the FSM Supreme Court "concurrent original jurisdiction in cases arising under this Constitution; national law or treaties; and in disputes between a state and a citizen of another state, between citizens of different states, and between a state or a citizen thereof, and a foreign state, citizen, or subject." FSM Const. art. XI, § 6(b). The plaintiffs assert that the parties are of diverse citizenship, but do not indicate if this court has § 6(b) jurisdiction for any other reason.

The plaintiffs assert the following causes of action: (1) violation of Pohnpei State Law 2L-195-91; (2) breach of contract; (3) quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and restitution; and (4) attorney's fees and costs. Compl. The first and fourth causes of action sound in Pohnpei statutory law; and the second and third sound in contract. The plaintiffs assert no causes of action arising under the FSM Constitution, or FSM national law or treaties. This matter is, therefore, before this court solely due to diversity.

The court set out standards for deciding questions of abstention in Gimnang v. Yap, 5 FSM Intrm. 13 (App. 1991). Generally, although the national courts have primary responsibility in litigation under article XI, section 6(b), cases which arise under national law are distinguishable from diversity cases, and the courts should be more reluctant to abstain in cases arising under national law. Gimnang, 5 FSM Intrm. at 20-21. It follows therefore that the jurisdiction of the national courts in cases solely within article XI, section 6(b) by virtue of diversity of citizenship is far less compelling. Further, the Gimnang court held that the court should consider abstention or certification "[w]here the national courts are asked to rule on areas of the law which fall within state powers and in which there are identifiable, particularly strong, state interests." Gimnang, 5 FSM Intrm. at 21. Particularly, "where a state is attempting to establish a coherent administrative policy in a complex field in which there is substantial public concern," abstention becomes increasingly appropriate. Id.

Currently, no national statutes directly address overtime pay for private sector employment.¹ Nevertheless, or perhaps one reason therefor, wage and hour laws are a complex field in which there is substantial public concern. For this reason alone, abstention would be appropriate.

The plaintiffs argue in their opposition to the motion to abstain that the defendants are wrong to seek remand to the Pohnpei State Division of Personnel, Labor and Manpower Development ("Division"), because 19 Pon. C. § 2-117 states explicitly that the Division is a regulatory and not a judicial body, and because "19 PC 3-111(3) expressly authorizes a wronged employee to initiate class action litigation . . . in any court of competent jurisdiction." Pls.' Opp'n Mot. Abstain at 5.

The plaintiffs are correct to observe that the Division is not a judicial body. However, the State of Pohnpei is not without its own judicial bodies more than competent to interpret Pohnpei state law, both as codified in statutes, and in contract law. The point of abstention is not to identify a particular agency to resolve questions of state law, but in situations like this matter, to relinquish jurisdiction to avoid needless conflict with a state's administration of its own affairs. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 3

[18 FSM R. 103]

(pocket ed. 1996). Thus, when the court abstains, this matter need not be heard before the Division unless state law so requires-and the most competent authority on interpretation of Pohnpei state law is none other than the Pohnpei Supreme Court.

Finally, in abstaining from this matter, the court need not address the plaintiffs' motion to certify the complaint as a class action, or the defendant's motion for a protective order.

III. CONCLUSION

Because the plaintiffs' causes of action are rooted in questions of state law, and because the field of wage and hour laws is a complex one in which there is substantial public concern and in which the State of Pohnpei has the right to establish a coherent administrative policy, it is altogether appropriate for this court to relinquish jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court HEREBY GRANTS the motion for abstention and HEREBY ORDERS that this matter be DISMISSED.

Footnotes:

¹ Title 51, "Labor," addresses overtime only once, in section 139(2), which requires an employer of a nonresident worker to present a copy of the worker's contract, which must contain certain information including a wage scale for regular and overtime work, prior to approval of the nonresident worker's entry to the FSM. The court observes that the statute was enacted by the Congress of Micronesia and encoded under the Trust Territory Code, before the independence of the FSM.