ATTACHMENT AND EXECUTION

The statutes concerning writs of execution protect certain property of the debtor from execution, but contain no suggestion that other creditors can obtain rights superior to that of the judgment creditor in property covered by a writ of execution. Bank of Guam v. Island Hardware, Inc., 2 FSM Intrm. 281, 285 (Pon. 1986).

While the statute authorizing execution against "the personal property of the person against whom the judgment has been rendered" contains no exceptions for third party creditors, neither does it purport to sweep away pre-existing property rights, including security interests, of such creditors, nor does the statute authorize the sale of property owned by others which happens to be in possession of the debtor at the time of execution. 6 F.S.M.C. 1407. Bank of Guam v. Island Hardware, Inc., 2 FSM Intrm. 281, 285 (Pon. 1986).

Attachment and seizure create statutory and possessory lien rights which will be unaffected by subsequent writs of execution, but will be subject to national government's wage and salary tax lien claims under 54 F.S.M.C. 135(2), to wage claims of low level employees and laborers, and to pre-existing national government lien rights under 54 F.S.M.C. 153. In re Mid-Pacific Constr. Co., 3 FSM Intrm. 292, 303 (Pon. 1988).

An execution creditor holds a more powerful position than a mere judgment creditor. In re Mid-Pacific Constr. Co., 3 FSM Intrm. 292, 306 (Pon. 1988).

Writs of execution will not be granted on an automatic basis, but only when it has been shown that judgment creditors have seriously explored the possibility of satisfying the judgment through other means, in order to avoid bankruptcies or economic hardships. In re Mid-Pacific Constr. Co., 3 FSM Intrm. 292, 306 (Pon. 1988).

Where it becomes apparent that claims or creditors will outstrip the value of debtor's assets, the approach is to give all creditors an opportunity to submit claims, and distribute any available proceeds on an equitable basis. In re Mid-Pacific Constr. Co., 3 FSM Intrm. 292, 306 (Pon. 1988).

Where purchasers at a judicial sale are not served by summons and complaint pursuant to FSM Civil Rule 3 but receive notice of a motion seeking confirmation of the sale and made by a creditor of the party whose property was sold, and where the purchasers do not object to the motion, confirmation of the sale is effective and binding on the purchasers and is not violative of their rights of due process. Sets v. Island Hardware, 3 FSM Intrm. 365, 368 (Pon. 1988).

Creditors with judgments more than 10 days old are entitled to writs of execution upon request. In re Pacific Islands Distrib. Co., 3 FSM Intrm. 575, 584 (Pon. 1988).

Although there is no provision for garnishment in Pohnpei state law nor any national statute explicitly providing for garnishment, garnishment of wages is an acceptable means for enforcing an unpaid judgment, pursuant to the FSM Supreme Court's statutory "general powers," its power to enforce judgments in any manner common in courts in the United States, and its power to issue writs of attachment. Bank of Guam v. Elwise, 4 FSM Intrm. 150, 152 (Pon. 1989).

Although technically attachment and garnishment are distinct processes, attachment applying to assets in the defendant's possession and garnishment involving assets in the possession of a third party, the statutory language regarding attachment would seem to apply to both cases. Bank of Guam v. Elwise, 4 FSM Intrm. 150, 152 (Pon. 1989).

The requirements and procedures for issuing a writ of garnishment should be the same as those applied to attachment proceedings. Bank of Guam v. Elwise, 4 FSM Intrm. 150, 152 (Pon. 1989).

The FSM Supreme Court's power to issue writs of garnishment is clearly discretionary. Bank of Guam v. Elwise, 4 FSM Intrm. 150, 152 (Pon. 1989).

Where garnishment is warranted, then anything beyond what is reasonably necessary for the defendant to support himself and his dependents can be garnished. Bank of Guam v. Elwise, 4 FSM Intrm. 150, 153 (Pon. 1989).

Absent specific legislative authority the Chuuk State Judiciary Act properly bars the state court from attaching, executing, or garnishment of public property. Billimon v. Chuuk, 5 FSM Intrm. 130, 136 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1991).

The statutory right of a judgment creditor to obtain immediate issuance of a writ of execution implies as well a legislative intent that holders of writs be paid on the basis of a first-in-right rule according to the dates of the individual parties' writs. In re Island Hardware, Inc., 5 FSM Intrm. 170, 173 (App. 1991).

Among execution creditors the claims of those whose writs are dated earliest have priority to an insolvent's assets over those whose writs are dated later. Individual writ-holders are to be paid on the basis of first-in-time, first-in-right rule according to the dates of their writs. Western Sales Trading Co. v. Ponape Federation of Coop. Ass'ns, 6 FSM Intrm. 592, 593 (Pon. 1994).

A writ of attachment is a process by which property is seized and held to satisfy an established debt or prospective judgment and may only issue against the property of a defendant debtor. The property of a third party, to which the debtor has no possessory rights, may not be seized, held, and eventually sold to satisfy the obligations of the debtor. Pan Oceania Maritime Servs. (Guam) Ltd. v. Micronesia Shipping, 7 FSM Intrm. 37, 38 (Pon. 1995).

That a defendant debtor is a shareholder of a corporation that might receive a favorable settlement in the future and might pay a dividend to its shareholders does not entitle creditors to attach that corporation's assets. Pan Oceania Maritime Servs. (Guam) Ltd. v. Micronesia Shipping, 7 FSM Intrm. 37, 39 (Pon. 1995).

A writ of execution may issue without seriously exploring other possible means of satisfying the judgment. House of Travel v. Neth, 7 FSM Intrm. 228, 229 (Pon. 1995).

Execution may be had against a judgment debtor's non-exempt personal property, not against his interests in land. House of Travel v. Neth, 7 FSM Intrm. 228, 229 (Pon. 1995).

Property may not be taken by the government, even in aid of a judgment, without due process of law. In executing the writ, due process of law may be assured by directing the executing officer to comply strictly with the statutory provisions for levying a writ of execution. House of Travel v. Neth, 7 FSM Intrm. 228, 229-30 (Pon. 1995).

The right to prejudgment seizure must exist by the law of the state in which the action is pending. In the absence of state law, no remedy is available under Rule 64. Bank of Hawaii v. Kolonia Consumer Coop. Ass'n, 7 FSM Intrm. 659, 662 (Pon. 1996).

Under Pohnpei law a court may issue writs of attachment, for special cause shown, supported by a statement under oath. Bank of Hawaii v. Kolonia Consumer Coop. Ass'n, 7 FSM Intrm. 659, 662 (Pon. 1996).

Attachment is an extraordinary, prejudgment remedy, which is purely ancillary to the main suit, has nothing to do with the merits, and is a summary, anticipatory method of impounding defendant's assets to facilitate collection of the judgment against him, if and when one is obtained. Attachment did not exist at common law, and is created by statute. Bank of Hawaii v. Kolonia Consumer Coop. Ass'n, 7 FSM Intrm. 659, 662 (Pon. 1996).

Statutes authorizing attachment must be construed strictly. In general, attachment is available only in certain kinds of actions and then only upon a showing of special grounds. Bank of Hawaii v. Kolonia Consumer Coop. Ass'n, 7 FSM Intrm. 659, 662 (Pon. 1996).

Under Pohnpei law attachment appears to be available in any suit for collection of money, but not available in judgments affecting land, and the statute requires only that "special cause" be shown for the issuance of a writ of attachment. Bank of Hawaii v. Kolonia Consumer Coop. Ass'n, 7 FSM Intrm. 659, 662 (Pon. 1996).

The existence of a sale of some of a debtor's assets is not special cause sufficient to grant a request for attachment. Bank of Hawaii v. Kolonia Consumer Coop. Ass'n, 7 FSM Intrm. 659, 663 (Pon. 1996).

Under the Chuuk Constitution, statutory authorization is required as a predicate to expenditure of state funds, and the Chuuk state court does not have the power to issue an execution order against state property. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 208, 210 (Chk. 1997).

Process to enforce payment of a money judgment is by writ of execution, in accordance with the practice and procedure of the state in which the court is held, except that an FSM statute governs to the extent it is applicable. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 208, 210-11 (Chk. 1997).

A state may not use its own constitution to defeat enforcement of a judgment entered on a civil rights claim brought pursuant to the mandate of the national constitution and statutes. Thus, a state constitutional provision will not prevent a civil rights plaintiff from using national execution procedures to obtain satisfaction of his judgment. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 208, 213 (Chk. 1997).

A non-party is deprived of due process of law when a case is started against it without notice or it having been made a party, when an order in aid of judgment has been issued against the non-party without a judgment and a hearing held following notice, and when a writ of execution has been issued against a non-party and without notice or hearing to determine the amount to be executed upon. Bank of Guam v. O'Sonis, 8 FSM Intrm. 301, 304 (Chk. 1998).

A writ of execution issued in violation of statute, against the property of a non-party in a case for which no judgment has been issued and in which the judge should have recused himself is a wrongfully-issued writ. Bank of Guam v. O'Sonis, 8 FSM Intrm. 301, 305 (Chk. 1998).

FSM Civil Rule 70 provides for five different remedies, one of which is a writ of attachment. Garnishment exists in the FSM through judicial interpretation of the FSM attachment statute, 6 F.S.M.C. 1405(2), and because attachment is an available remedy under Rule 70, it follows that garnishment is also. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 312, 314 n.1 (Chk. 1998).

The statute authorizing issuance of an order in aid of judgment, 6 F.S.M.C. 1409, presents two issues: the debtor's ability to pay, and the most expeditious way that payment can be accomplished. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 312, 316 (Chk. 1998).

A court has an interest in insuring that its orders are heeded, and this interest exists apart from any interest the parties may have in the litigation. A court may take whatever reasonable steps are appropriate to insure compliance with its orders. It need not rely on the parties themselves to prescribe the way in which its orders will be carried out, or its judgments executed. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 312, 318 (Chk. 1998).

By statute, a court has wide latitude in crafting an order in aid of judgment and may even modify the order on its own motion. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 312, 319 (Chk. 1998).

Garnishment exists as a remedy available in the FSM to a judgment creditor. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 312, 319 (Chk. 1998).

Creation of a doctrine of sovereign immunity of the FSM from garnishment should be left to the specific, unambiguous, and explicit action of Congress. The court will not create such a doctrine by judicial action. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 312, 321 (Chk. 1998).

Hypothetical administrative difficulties do not justify holding that garnishment does not apply to the national government. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 312, 321 (Chk. 1998).

FSM Civil Rule 69 expressly authorizes the court to issue process other than a writ of execution in the course of enforcing a judgment. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 312, 322 (Chk. 1998).

The provision that money judgments against the FSM shall be paid from funds appropriated by Congress is not implicated when the FSM is a mere garnishee because garnishment is directed toward the property of the judgment debtor held by the FSM, not toward property of the FSM itself. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 312, 322 (Chk. 1998).

Under 11 F.S.M.C. 701 et seq. a private cause of action is provided to any person whose constitutional rights are violated. In order for the remedy provided by 11 F.S.M.C. 703 to be effective, it must be enforceable. Where the defendant in a civil rights action is a state, this means that the remedy should not be dependent upon subsequent state legislative action, such as appropriation of funds, which would thwart the Congressional mandate that 11 F.S.M.C. 701 is meant to implement. Accordingly, the FSM Supreme Court is not precluded from issuing an order in aid of judgment against a state in the absence of a state legislative appropriation. Davis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 338, 341 (Chk. 1998).

Under 6 F.S.M.C. 1409, an individual judgment debtor is allowed to "retain such property and such portion of his income as may be necessary to provide the reasonable living requirements of the debtor and his dependents," but if the debtor has some limited ability to pay, the court can order some payment. Davis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 338, 342 (Chk. 1998).

Under 6 F.S.M.C. 1410(2), an order in aid of judgment may provide for the sale of particular assets, such as unencumbered property that is not necessary for the debtor to meet his family and customary obligations, and payment of the net proceeds to the creditor. Davis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 338, 343 (Chk. 1998).

Under 6 F.S.M.C. 1409, the court makes two inquiries: the judgment debtor's ability to pay, and the fastest manner to accomplish payment. Davis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 338, 343 (Chk. 1998).

Because the court must consider the debtor's ability to pay, an order which takes this factor properly into consideration will not result, in and of itself, in the financial undoing of a debtor. Davis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 338, 344 (Chk. 1998).

It is unlikely that in paying the judgment an appellant would waive its appeal, so long as payment was made under protest. In holding that the right to appeal was not precluded by payment, the courts have sometimes noted that payment had been made under protest; conversely, in holding that the right to appeal was barred by payment, the courts have sometimes noted that payment had not been made under protest. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 460, 461 (Chk. 1998).

There is no persuasive authority that should a garnishee pay a judgment pursuant to a garnishment order, that the garnishee would waive its rights to appeal. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 460, 462 (Chk. 1998).

A motion for an order in aid of judgment against the State of Chuuk to assign sufficient assets to pay a money judgment will be denied because the state may make payments subject only to legislative appropriation. Judah v. Chuuk, 9 FSM Intrm. 41, 42 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1999).

Chuuk state courts have the power to issue all writs for equitable and legal relief, except the power of attachment, execution and garnishment of public property. Kama v. Chuuk, 9 FSM Intrm. 496, 497 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1999).

The only purpose of statutes authorizing orders in aid of judgment is to force the payment of a judgment and to provide means to collect a money judgment, which is the same as proceedings for attachment, garnishment or execution. Kama v. Chuuk, 9 FSM Intrm. 496, 498 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1999).

The Trust Territory Code provisions for orders in aid of judgment are not available as against Chuuk because, when it barred the courts' power of attachment, execution and garnishment of public property, the clear legislative intent was to supersede or repeal all provisions of the Trust Territory Code, Title 8 insofar as they allowed seizure of Chuuk state property. Kama v. Chuuk, 9 FSM Intrm. 496, 498 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1999).

Historically, orders in aid of judgment and orders in aid of execution serve the same purpose and the terms are used interchangeably. Their purpose is to provide a means of discovery to inquire into the assets and ability of a judgment debtor to pay a judgment. Kama v. Chuuk, 9 FSM Intrm. 496, 498 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1999).

Proceedings in aid of a judgment are supplementary proceedings to enforce a judgment, the same as attachment, execution and garnishment, and as against Chuuk State public property, are prohibited by 4 of the Chuuk Judiciary Act. Kama v. Chuuk, 9 FSM Intrm. 496, 498 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1999).
$@tc_F,98uXF 4@;|@t! v<"@YF0GD`ANBv,$ Y@;x BDDP;؅@9&u` vPV_'*VNd; D@w%~3;t/A, ;wA*40@LFdrb9P,t @,4400@@`@L9uxa&Qo@+pd^j h$lj AePi@_M\p Y@eΐSypb0.AS F ^ @qtfpNFe f p$u"St S quVYfWtdF>.N+IN~ W PS$Ap 3tˀ yÃ6@ t jjS!wM3@GWE f  E 9} _tN ( %Q  pB^[]!A @pyt$Ix  QPAYu s#DMEM >} B ?G @`tuP MsC `0%~E E @S3@ɄۉАTRRPY VW@GD7 |x~`jY;AN$0$~ pQ`RRԕRRP鷀P tGt6t%HHt錶逶t"2hv\q*u0 qb@9H!'ˍDA  *!*ѰsXq鶠It7ht&ltwq0钰S醶 z<6u4uGG%Z<3U2uBBQt-PRPWSm094~[NE+FBAt!΀90u0uB0@ AI?.A->2t k -F+@ t #q='+ 6+ ùg@Vj @$ Ytu WVj0CtYD~PK7HA3fPEPCYCY~9$M!Yt