AGENCY
Under the common law there are only two reasons for distinguishing between agents of a principal who are "servants" or "employees" of the principal and agents who are independent contractors. The most common is to determine the possible liability of the principal for torts of the agent within the scope of employment. The second purpose is to determine the obligations, rights and immunities between the principal and the agent. Earlier common law rules making distinctions for this purpose have for the most part been supplanted by social legislation such as workers' compensation, fair labor standards, social security, minimum wage and income tax laws. Rauzi v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 8, 15 (Pon. 1985).
The emphasis in governmental tort liability cases has been on the special status of government, its functions and its officials rather than on the degree of control tests commonly employed in nongovernmental cases. Even those commentators who specifically note that the respondeat superior doctrine applies to the government analyze governmental liability issues in terms of public policy considerations rather than through a degree of control analysis which distinguishes between closely supervised and high-ranking officials. Rauzi v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 8, 16 (Pon. 1985).
The excavation of large holes on the land of private citizens, in areas where children play, and near a public road, is inherently dangerous and calls for special precautions. One who causes such work to be undertaken may not escape liability simply by employing an independent contractor to do the work. Ray v. Electrical Contracting Corp., 2 FSM Intrm. 21, 25 (App. 1985).
When a state government is acting on behalf of the national government by virtue of the joint administration of law enforcement act, the state's officers and employees are agents of the national government and are acting "under color of authority" within the meaning of 6 F.S.M.C. 702(5). Plais v. Panuelo, 5 FSM Intrm. 179, 209-10 (Pon. 1991).
A party to a foreign fishing agreement voluntarily assumes primary liability and responsibility for its own failure to comply with the law, and for similar failures on the part of its fishing vessels and vessel operators within the FSM. Such a party also assumes a legal duty to ensure that the operators of its licensed vessels comply with all applicable provisions of FSM law. FSM v. Cheng Chia-W (II), 7 FSM Intrm. 205, 212 (Pon. 1995).
A person can be criminally liable for the conduct of another if having a legal duty to prevent the commission of an offense, he fails to make proper effort to do so. FSM v. Cheng Chia-W (II), 7 FSM Intrm. 205, 212 (Pon. 1995).
The acts of agents, illegal or otherwise, are the acts of the principal itself provided that those acts are in the ordinary course of the agent's business relationship with its principal because under accepted principles of agency law a principal is responsible for the criminal acts of its agents provided that those acts where committed in furtherance of the agents' business relationship with the principal. FSM v. Cheng Chia-W (II), 7 FSM Intrm. 205, 212-13 (Pon. 1995).
The principal is bound by, and liable for, the acts which his agent does with or within the actual or apparent authority from the principal, and within the scope of the agent's employment. Black Micro Corp. v. Santos, 7 FSM Intrm. 311, 315-16 (Pon. 1995).
Under the law of agency, a principal is liable not just for the expressly authorized acts and contracts of his agent, but also, with respect to third parties who deal with his agent in good faith, for actions his agent takes with apparent authority to act on behalf of the principal. Apparent authority may be implied where the principal passively permits the agent to appear to a third person to have authority to act on his behalf. Kosrae Island Credit Union v. Obet, 7 FSM Intrm. 416, 419 n.2 (App. 1996).
A principal is bound by, and liable for the acts of its agent if done with or within the actual or apparent authority from the principal and within the scope of the agent's employment. Bank of the FSM v. O'Sonis, 8 FSM Intrm. 67, 69 (Chk. 1997).
An agency relationship is based upon consent by one person that another shall act in his behalf and be subject to his control. Bank of the FSM v. O'Sonis, 8 FSM Intrm. 67, 69 (Chk. 1997).
The existence of an agency relationship is not negated merely because the agent is named by someone other than the principal. Bank of the FSM v. O'Sonis, 8 FSM Intrm. 67, 69 (Chk. 1997).
A party may require another to appoint an agent as a condition to an agreement. Bank of the FSM v. O'Sonis, 8 FSM Intrm. 67, 69 (Chk. 1997).
When a bank requires, as a condition of the loan, that a borrower have his employer make the loan repayments out of the borrower's paycheck the borrower's employer is acting as the agent of the borrower. Bank of the FSM v. O'Sonis, 8 FSM Intrm. 67, 69 (Chk. 1997).
When a fishing boat captain knows that he has caught fish and retained possession of fish while he had not maintained the required daily catch log in English that knowledge is attributable, under agency law principles, to the foreign fishing agreement party through which the boat was authorized. FSM v. Ting Hong Oceanic Enterprises, 8 FSM Intrm. 79, 91 (Pon. 1997).
A principal is bound by, and liable for, the acts of its agent done with or within the actual or apparent authority from the principal and within the scope of the agent's employment. Agency relationships are based upon consent by one person that another shall act in his behalf and be subject to his control. FSM v. Ting Hong Oceanic Enterprises, 8 FSM Intrm. 79, 91-92 (Pon. 1997).
The duties of an agent for the service of process are not the same as those of an attorney. Practically anyone may serve in the capacity as an agent. It may entail little more than receiving legal papers and promptly forwarding them on to the principal. Fabian v. Ting Hong Oceanic Enterprises, 8 FSM Intrm. 93, 94 (Chk. 1997).
When a law firm has been designated as an agent for service of process by a foreign corporation required to appoint one in the FSM, the law firm may remain the corporation's agent for service even if the corporation has left the FSM and the firm is no longer its attorney. Fabian v. Ting Hong Oceanic Enterprises, 8 FSM Intrm. 93, 94-95 (Chk. 1997).
A principal is bound by, and liable for, the acts of its agent, if those acts are done with actual or apparent authority from the principal and are within the scope of the agent's employment. FSM v. Ting Hong Oceanic Enterprises, 8 FSM Intrm. 166, 176 (Pon. 1997).
Because a corporate principal may be held criminally liable for its agent's conduct when the agent acts within the scope of its authority for the principal's benefit, a foreign fishing agreement party may be held criminally liable for the conduct of its authorized vessel. FSM v. Ting Hong Oceanic Enterprises, 8 FSM Intrm. 166, 176 (Pon. 1997).
An authorized vessel's master's knowledge is attributable to its foreign fishing agreement party because knowledge held by an agent or employee of a corporation may be attributed to its principal. FSM v. Ting Hong Oceanic Enterprises, 8 FSM Intrm. 166, 180 (Pon. 1997).
An agent and principal may be sued in the same action for the same cause of action even when the principal's liability is predicated solely on the agency. Kaminanga v. FSM College of Micronesia, 8 FSM Intrm. 438, 442 (Chk. 1998).
An agency relationship is based upon consent by one person that another shall act in his behalf and be subject to his control. A principal is bound by, and liable for the acts of its agent if done with or within the actual or apparent authority from the principal and within the scope of the agent's employment. Sigrah v. Timothy, 9 FSM Intrm. 48, 52 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1999).
When a general manager's actions in hiring, supervising and paying the employees of a sawmill were within the scope of authority granted to him by the principals, the sawmill's joint owners, the principals are bound by their agent's actions in hiring or authorizing the hiring of a sawmill employee. Sigrah v. Timothy, 9 FSM Intrm. 48, 52 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1999).
Under the common law, there are only two reasons for distinguishing between agents of a principal who are "servants" or "employees" of the principal and agents who are independent contractors. The most common is to determine the principal's possible liability for torts of the agent within the scope of employment. The second purpose is to determine the obligations, rights and immunities between the principal and the agent. Sigrah v. Timothy, 9 FSM Intrm. 48, 53 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1999).
A fishing association is not liable under a general theory of agency when the complaint does not make a general agency allegation, and instead asserts liability based on an agreement's language, and nothing in the agreement renders the other defendants the agents of the fishing association such that the association is liable under the respondeat superior doctrine for the damages flowing from a vessel's alleged negligent operation. Dai Wang Sheng v. Japan Far Seas Purse Seine Fishing Ass'n, 10 FSM Intrm. 112, 115 (Kos. 2001).