ADMIRALTY
A seaman's contract claim against the owner of the vessel upon which he served would be regarded as falling within the exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the FSM Supreme Court. FSM Const. art. XI, 6(a). Lonno v. Trust Territory (I), 1 FSM Intrm. 53, 68-71 (Kos. 1982).
The concept of admiralty is related uniquely to the law of nations. It consists of rules in large part intended to govern the conduct of various nations in their shipping and commercial activities. Lonno v. Trust Territory (I), 1 FSM Intrm. 53, 71 (Kos. 1982).
The Seaman's Protection Act, originally enacted for the entire Trust Territory by the Congress of Micronesia, relates to matters that now fall within the legislative powers of the national government under article IX, section 2 of the Constitution, and has therefore become a national law of the Federated States of Micronesia under article XV. That being so, a claim asserting rights under the Act falls within the jurisdiction of the FSM Supreme Court under article XI, section 6(b) of the Constitution as a case arising under national law. 19 F.S.M.C. 401-437. Lonno v. Trust Territory (I), 1 FSM Intrm. 53, 72 (Kos. 1982).
At the time when the FSM Constitution was adopted there was uncertainty as to whether, to establish United States federal court admiralty jurisdiction over a tort case, it was necessary to establish not only that the wrong occurred in navigable waters, but also that there was a relationship between the wrong and a traditional maritime activity. Weilbacher v. Kosrae, 3 FSM Intrm. 320, 323 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1988).
When passengers purchase passage in an ocean-going vessel for transportation, there is an implied maritime contract for passage even in the absence of written document. Weilbacher v. Kosrae, 3 FSM Intrm. 320, 323 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1988).
Exact scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not defined in the FSM Constitution or legislative history, but United States Constitution has a similar provision, so it is reasonable to expect that words in both Constitutions have similar meaning and effect. Weilbacher v. Kosrae, 3 FSM Intrm. 320, 323 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1988).
A dispute arising out of injury sustained by a passenger on a vessel transporting passengers from Kosrae to Pohnpei, at a time when the vessel is 30 miles from Kosrae, falls within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the FSM Supreme Court. Weilbacher v. Kosrae, 3 FSM Intrm. 320, 323 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1988).
The FSM Supreme Court's grant of original and exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime cases implies the adoption of admiralty or maritime cases as of the drafting and adoption of the FSM Constitution. Federal Business Dev. Bank v. S.S. Thorfinn, 4 FSM Intrm. 57, 59 (Truk 1989).
United States statutes regarding ships' mortgages will not be adopted as the common law of the Federated States of Micronesia, because their purposes are not applicable to the FSM and because their changing nature and complexity are not conducive to forming the basis of the common law of this nation. Federal Business Dev. Bank v. S.S. Thorfinn, 4 FSM Intrm. 57, 59-60 (Truk 1989).
The enforcement of ships' mortgages does not come within the admiralty jurisdiction of the FSM Supreme Court. Federal Business Dev. Bank v. S.S. Thorfinn, 4 FSM Intrm. 57, 60 (Truk 1989).
The maritime jurisdiction conferred on the FSM Supreme Court by the Constitution is not to be decided with reference to the details of United States cases and statutes concerning admiralty jurisdiction but instead with reference to the general maritime law of seafaring nations of the world, and to the law of nations. Federal Business Dev. Bank v. S.S. Thorfinn, 4 FSM Intrm. 367, 374 (App. 1990).
The FSM Supreme Court has jurisdiction over all cases which are maritime in nature including all maritime contracts, torts and injuries. Federal Business Dev. Bank v. S.S. Thorfinn, 4 FSM Intrm. 367, 374 (App. 1990).
The question of the enforceability of ship mortgages is a matter that falls within the maritime jurisdiction of the FSM Supreme Court under article XI, section 6(a) of the Constitution. Federal Business Dev. Bank v. S.S. Thorfinn, 4 FSM Intrm. 367, 376 (App. 1990).
Supplies and service that are necessaries when provided to a vessel give rise to maritime liens. Maruwa Shokai (Guam), Inc. v. Pyung Hwa 31, 6 FSM Intrm. 1, 3 (Pon. 1993).
A general agent is not barred from obtaining a maritime lien. Obtaining the lien depends on whether the supplies and services furnished the vessel are necessaries, not on the contractual relation. Maruwa Shokai (Guam), Inc. v. Pyung Hwa 31, 6 FSM Intrm. 1, 3 (Pon. 1993).
Necessaries are defined as those things reasonably needed in the business of the vessel. Maruwa Shokai (Guam), Inc. v. Pyung Hwa 31, 6 FSM Intrm. 1, 3 (Pon. 1993).
To be entitled to a maritime lien a provider of necessaries must rely on the credit of the vessel. General maritime law presumes that a provider of necessaries relies on the credit of the vessel. Maruwa Shokai (Guam), Inc. v. Pyung Hwa 31, 6 FSM Intrm. 1, 3 (Pon. 1993).
A contract provision for a line of credit that was never filled in as to the amount and never funded cannot overcome the presumption that a supplier of necessaries relied on the credit of the vessel. Maruwa Shokai (Guam), Inc. v. Pyung Hwa 31, 6 FSM Intrm. 1, 4 (Pon. 1993).
A maritime contract cannot be converted into a non-maritime one by stipulation of the parties so as to divest the court of its admiralty jurisdiction. Maruwa Shokai (Guam), Inc. v. Pyung Hwa 31, 6 FSM Intrm. 1, 4 (Pon. 1993).
A civil seizure and forfeiture action involving a commercial fishing vessel within FSM waters falls under the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the national courts. Pohnpei v. MV Hai Hsiang #36 (I), 6 FSM Intrm. 594, 599 (Pon. 1994).
The grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the national courts was intended to assist in the development of a uniform body of maritime law. Pohnpei v. MV Hai Hsiang #36 (I), 6 FSM Intrm. 594, 600 (Pon. 1994).
Where in rem jurisdiction over a vessel has not been established and its owner has not been made a party to the action an in rem action that includes a claim against the vessel's owner may be dismissed without prejudice. In re Kuang Hsing No. 127, 7 FSM Intrm. 81, 82 (Chk. 1995).
In an admiralty and maritime case for the in rem forfeiture of a vessel, jurisdiction and venue are so interrelated that the government, or its agents, may not move a defendant vessel from the state in which it was arrested where the FSM admiralty venue statute does not anticipate transfer even though the civil rules allow improper venue to be raised as a defense or to be waived. It is unclear what the result of such a move would be. FSM v. M.T. HL Achiever (I), 7 FSM Intrm. 221, 222-23 (Chk. 1995).
Where a vessel has been arrested pursuant to a warrant, a post-seizure hearing is required by the constitutional guarantee of due process. FSM v. M.T. HL Achiever (II), 7 FSM Intrm. 256, 257 (Chk. 1995).
The FSM Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases. This grant of exclusive jurisdiction is not made dependent upon constitutional grants of powers to other branches of the national government. When the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is exclusive it cannot abstain from deciding a case in favor of another court in the FSM because no other court in the country has jurisdiction. M/V Hai Hsiang #36 v. Pohnpei, 7 FSM Intrm. 456, 459 (App. 1996).
Only the FSM Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime and certain other cases under the Constitution. The other national courts authorized by the Constitution, but which Congress has never created, are only authorized to entertain cases of concurrent jurisdiction, and thus could never exercise jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases. Maritime jurisdiction can reside only in one national court the Supreme Court. M/V Hai Hsiang #36 v. Pohnpei, 7 FSM Intrm. 456, 460 n.2 (App. 1996).
The hallmark of an in rem proceeding in admiralty is that it is an adjudication of all rights in the vessel, good against the world, not just of the rights of the parties to the action. An in rem proceeding against a vessel can only be had in the context of an admiralty or maritime case. M/V Hai Hsiang #36 v. Pohnpei, 7 FSM Intrm. 456, 461-62 (App. 1996).
The FSM Constitution, by its plain language, grants exclusive and original jurisdiction to the FSM Supreme Court trial division for admiralty and maritime cases. It makes no exceptions. Therefore all in rem actions against marine vessels, even those by a state seeking forfeiture for violation of its fishing laws, must proceed in the trial division of the FSM Supreme Court. M/V Hai Hsiang #36 v. Pohnpei, 7 FSM Intrm. 456, 463 (App. 1996).
Actions to enforce in personam civil penalties for violations of state fishing laws are within the exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the FSM Supreme Court. M/V Hai Hsiang #36 v. Pohnpei, 7 FSM Intrm. 456, 464-65 (App. 1996).
Proceedings concerning the arrest or release of a vessel should take place in the civil action in which it is a defendant, not in a related criminal case. Ting Hong Oceanic Enterprises v. FSM, 7 FSM Intrm. 471, 474 n.4, 475 n.5 (App. 1996).
Generally, to complete a court's jurisdiction in an in rem action, the res must be seized and be under the court's control. In other words, jurisdiction of the res is obtained by a seizure under process of the court, whereby it is held to abide such order as the court may make concerning it. Kosrae v. M/V Voea Lomipeau, 9 FSM Intrm. 366, 370 (Kos. 2000).
When a vessel has not been seized and is not in the FSM, the court has not obtained jurisdiction over it and the complaint as to the vessel must be dismissed. Kosrae v. M/V Voea Lomipeau, 9 FSM Intrm. 366, 370 (Kos. 2000).
When the complaint states that it is an admiralty and maritime action and that the plaintiffs are invoking the court's in rem and in personam jurisdiction, plaintiffs' failure to style their action against a vessel as in rem in the caption is merely a formal error and not a fatal defect, and the caption can always be amended to correct technical defects. Moses v. M.V. Sea Chase, 10 FSM Intrm. 45, 51 (Chk. 2001).
The only way a vessel can be a defendant in a civil action is if the proceeding against it is in rem. The FSM Supreme Court may exercise in rem jurisdiction over a vessel for damage done by that vessel. Moses v. M.V. Sea Chase, 10 FSM Intrm. 45, 51 (Chk. 2001).
In order for a court to exercise in rem jurisdiction, the thing (such as a vessel) over which jurisdiction is to be exercised (or its substitute, e.g., a posted bond) must be physically present in the jurisdiction and seized by court process and under the court's control, whereby it is held to abide such order as the court may make concerning it. Moses v. M.V. Sea Chase, 10 FSM Intrm. 45, 51 (Chk. 2001).
When a vessel was never seized and brought under the court's jurisdiction and is no longer present in the jurisdiction, a court cannot exercise in rem jurisdiction over it and all such claims against the vessel will be dismissed without prejudice. Moses v. M.V. Sea Chase, 10 FSM Intrm. 45, 52 (Chk. 2001).
Dismissal of an in rem suit against a vessel does not act to dismiss the suit against its captain and crew as that is an action in personam, not in rem. Moses v. M.V. Sea Chase, 10 FSM Intrm. 45, 52 (Chk. 2001).